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Abstract

This thesis presents methods to increase savings in the global vaccine market without compromising its
sustainability. Considering a hypothetically coordinated vaccine market (HCVM), where one or more coordinating entities are responsible for negotiating quantities and prices of vaccines on behalf of countries with
different purchasing powers, this work explores four different and complementary issues related to market
configurations impacting global affordability and profits: (1) the level of cooperation among coordinating
entities; (2) optimal country assignment to coordinating entities; (3) benefits in procuring vaccines through
tenders of formularies rather than purchasing doses individually; and (4) the value of a dollar saved in different countries. Additionally, these studies incorporate prescriptive and descriptive analytics with economic
theory exploring the incentives that could bring the global vaccine market closer to the HCVM. The findings
presented in this thesis contribute both to the literature and to the sustainability of the global vaccine market
with specific recommendations to improve affordability for low-income countries with minimal impact to
other market segments or to the vaccine producers.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
Vaccines are an essential mechanism credited for saving over 2 million lives every year [4]. Treating patients suffering from preventable diseases is many times more expensive than avoiding them through immunization, placing vaccines among the most cost-effective healthcare interventions [5]. Whitney et al.
[6] estimates that in the US alone, vaccines saved over $1.38 trillion dollars in total societal costs between
1994 and 2013, and Ozawa et al. [7] estimates savings up to 44 times the amount invested. However, there
remains room for improvement. The World Health Organization (WHO [8]) estimated 19.5 million infants
did not receive essential vaccines in 2018, with 60% of them concentrated in ten low- and middle-income
countries [8, 9, 10]. The Covid-19 pandemic exacerbated the situation by raising that figure to 23 million in
2020 [11].
Throughout this study, we research how vaccine affordability behaves in novel market configurations. Special attention is given to configurations that would lower prices in developing countries while still guaranteeing profit to the vaccine producers. We create metrics of affordability and profits to test four main research
questions:

Q1 How does a market configuration in which buyers cooperate to achieve better overall savings while
maintaining profits compare to configurations with no or only partial buyer cooperation?
Q2 In a global market with limited buyer cooperation, under which criteria should countries team up to
improve vaccine affordability and profits?
Q3 Could vaccines be more affordable for developing countries if sold into a bundle of vaccines rather
than individually? How would this sales model affect profits for producers?
1
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Phase

Country GNI (US$)

Co-Finance Policy

Annual Increase

1
2

≤ 1,045
≥ 1,045 and ≤ 1,580

0.20
total contribution in previous year
total costs in previous year’

None
15%

3

> 1,580

15% greater than in the last year of
previous phase

Linear cost increase to 100% of
costs in 5 years

Table 1.1: Phases of Gavi’s co-financing policy according to GNI described in [1].

Q4 If vaccine purchasing savings for low-income countries are explicitly prioritized, what is the impact
on savings and profits for the global market?

In the following section, we expand the description of the vaccine market to establish the relevance of
questions Q1 to Q4. Together, they present a comprehensive vision of the impact different interventions
can have in each element of the global vaccine market. To answer those questions, we explore different
mechanisms that already exist in the market and propose ways to adapt the negotiation process to the benefit
of each stakeholder.
In the envisioned global vaccine market, countries satisfy their immunization needs by procuring vaccines
from a limited set of producers. low-income countries have access to limited coordination via pooled procurement mechanisms, through which countries pool financial resources to buy vaccines as a group and
take advantage of economies of scale [12]. The Pan American Health Organization (PAHO)’s Revolving
Fund uses this mechanism to purchase vaccines for Latin America. Alternatively, an external coordinating
entity or a procurer buys vaccines on behalf of a group of countries, as the United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF) and Gavi do for a subset of vaccines for 73 countries eligible to their support. Vaccine producers
can offer those lower vaccine prices per dose by benefiting from a more stable and predictable demand with
pooled procurement [1], facilitating production, and use of tiered pricing to push vaccines [13]. Table 1.1
illustrates Gavi’s co-financing policy for its member countries as it was approved in June 2016.
Through tiered pricing, producers segment the buyers into defined price levels depending on the buyer’s
income [13]. For pricing purposes, vaccine producers have traditionally grouped countries as high-, uppermiddle-, lower-middle-, or low-income countries based on The World Bank country classification (see Table
1.2). Pricing tiers also depend on specific vaccines. Resale of low-priced vaccines to high-income countries
is restricted by the regulatory approvals, cold-chain logistics, differences in the immunization schedules and
product choice. Different producers might use different market segmentation for each of their vaccines,
justifying the exploration of whether there is an optimal level of segmentation overall.
Multiple reasons contribute to the lack of affordability, despite the benefits of pooled procurement and
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Classification

Abbreviation

High-income
Upper-middle-income
Lower-middle-income
Low-income

HIC
UMIC
LMIC
LIC

3
Lower Country GNI Limit
(US$)

Upper Country GNI Limit
(US$)

12,055
3,896
996
-

12,055
3,896
995

Table 1.2: World Bank classification for countries based on income [2].

tiered pricing. Some of those reasons include: (1) the vaccine supply, by volume, is highly concentrated
in a limited number of producers [5], (2) the monetary value of the vaccine market is concentrated on
sales to high-income countries, (3) logistics factors affecting vaccine distribution, and (4) political turmoil
disrupting immunization campaigns, and (5) national healthcare investments. By 2018, 80% of the entire
vaccine supply by volume was produced by five large vaccine producers [9], and vaccine purchases by highincome countries generated 82% of the dollar value of the vaccine market, despite representing only 20%
of the global demand by volume [14]. As a consequence, many vaccines are designed and produced for
high-income countries exclusively [15].
Gavi and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation initiated a market-shaping strategy to increase affordability
and market security for low-income countries [16]. While those efforts have mostly yielded positive results,
there is a risk of the supply of pentavalent and HPV vaccines decreasing as those interventions continue [17].
The goal of market-shaping is to achieve a "healthy" vaccine market, which is defined by Gavi through eight
pillars: (1) supply is sufficient to meet the demand; (2) vaccine products meet the countries’ preferences
for packaging, sizes, and other customizable parameters; (3) supply is secure against shortages; (4) supply
is not dependent on a single producer; (5) supply is not overly dependent on a single regulatory entity; (6)
other costs of vaccination are taken into account; (7) producers become more efficient through competition;
(8) and product innovation is sustainable. As we explore how novel market configurations can impact the
global vaccine market, those eight goals provide guidance in defining restrictions and objective functions.
The problems presented in Chapters 2 to 5 are proposed and developed as extensions of optimization models
existing in the literature to represent the global market. Proano et al. [18] proposed a global hypothetically
coordinated vaccine market (HCVM) where a single monopsonistic entity simultaneously maximizes affordability and profits by recommending optimal vaccine procurement quantities and their pricing ranges
for a single-period procurement for all antigens demanded in the HCVM. We characterized a family of related problems with immediate application in vaccine distribution that can potentially be generalized to other
fields with a similar market setup. This family of related problems was supported through grant OP1152241
of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. We highlight three key assumptions of the original ABP formula-
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tion: all related problems refer to the HCVM (A1); a hypothetical tender process with a single negotiation
period for all buyers at the same time is assumed for all antigens required by the global market (A2) to
satisfy immunization needs over a given time-horizon that is also the same for all buyers (A3), e.g. one
year. In the current global market, coordination is limited. Even coordinating entities such as Gavi procure
different vaccines at different times, with a different time-horizon for each contract (tender).
The remaining chapters of this document are organized as follows. Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 present the
research problems chosen for detailed study, how the research questions Q1 to Q4 can be adapted to better
fit those research problems, the methodology proposed to arrive at satisfactory answers, their results and
subsequent conclusions and practical recommendations. Chapters 2 to 5 have been crafted as stand-alone
articles for publication. Each study is presented with its own literature review section specific to its research
questions, in lieu of a generalized literature review section for the dissertation which would repeat many of
the papers discussed individually in the following chapters.

Chapter 2

Study 1: Enhancing Affordability and Profit
in a Non-cooperative Coordinated Pediatric
Vaccine Market
This study considers a hypothetical global pediatric vaccine market where multiple coordinating entities
make optimal procurement decisions on behalf of countries with different purchasing power. Each entity
aims to improve affordability for the countries it supports while maintaining a profitable market for vaccine
producers. This study analyzes the effect of several factors on affordability and profitability: the number
of non-cooperative coordinating entities making procuring decisions, the number of market segments in
which countries are grouped for tiered pricing purposes, how producers recover fixed production costs, and
the procuring order of the coordinating entities. The study relies on a framework where entities negotiate
sequentially with vaccine producers following a three-stage optimization process that solves an MIP and
two LP problems to determine the optimal procurement plans and prices per dose that maximize savings
for the entities’ countries and profit for the vaccine producers. The study’s results challenge current vaccine
market dynamics and contribute with novel alternative strategies to orchestrate the interaction of buyers,
producers, and coordinating entities for enhancing affordability in a non-cooperative market. Key results
show that the order in which the coordinating entities negotiate with vaccine producers and how the latter
recuperate their fixed cost investments can significantly affect profitability and affordability. Furthermore,
low-income countries can procure vaccines more affordably while satisfying their demand by negotiating
through entities handling a higher number of market segments, each with a smaller group of countries. In
contrast, upper-middle and high-income countries increase their affordability by procuring through entities
with fewer and more extensive market segments. A procurement order that follows entities based on the
5
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descending income level of their countries offers higher opportunities to increase affordability and profit.

2.1

Introduction

Pediatric vaccines are credited for saving more than 2 million lives every year [4]. They are among the most
cost-effective public healthcare interventions ever employed, as treating ill patients is more expensive than
preventing diseases through immunization [5]. Whitney et al. [6] estimates that in the US alone, pediatric
vaccines saved over $1.38 trillion in total societal costs between 1994 and 2013.
The global pediatric vaccine market consists of countries that procure vaccines to satisfy their immunization
needs from a limited set of producers. High- and upper-middle-income countries typically buy vaccines on
their own via public and private purchases. In contrast, lower-income countries rely on pool procurement and
tiered pricing to take advantage of economies of scale and secure better prices [12, 19]. For example, over
thirty Latin American countries procure vaccines as a group through the Pan American Health Organization
(PAHO)’s Revolving Fund. Similarly, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) procures vaccines
for nearly 70 low- and lower-middle-income countries eligible to receive financial support from donors
such as Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance. Gavi is a multi-lateral organization with private and public donors
that works to improve affordable vaccine access in the poorest countries of world [20]. All countries buying
vaccines through either PAHO’s Revolving Fund or UNICEF pay the same price per dose for a given vaccine.
Although, Gavi has different co-financing levels with different countries.
Pooled procurement also benefits vaccine producers. By securing more affordable vaccines for low-income
countries, PAHO, UNICEF, and Gavi have helped to develop a more stable and predictable demand for pediatric vaccine producers [1], facilitating their manufacturing and fostering their ability to use tiered pricing
to push vaccines inventories[13]. Furthermore, PAHO and UNICEF act as coordinators between buyers and
producers. These coordinators negotiate vaccine prices at the most affordable levels for their countries while
trying to ensure that at such prices, the pediatric vaccine market remains financially attractive for the producers and does not jeopardize future supply. Although PAHO and UNICEF collaborate, they independently
administer their vaccine tenders to secure supply for the countries. Consequently, PAHO and UNICEF have
their own pricing levels.
Through tiered pricing, producers set different price levels for a vaccine depending on the buyers’ income
levels[13]. Traditionally, vaccine producers have grouped countries in four tiers, as high-, upper-middle-,
lower-middle-, or low-income countries following The World Bank country classification (see Table 2.1);
but some producers have their own tier structures for different vaccines. Reselling low-priced vaccines to
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Abbreviation

High-income countries
Upper-middle-income countries
Lower-middle-income countries
Low-income countries

HIC
UMIC
LMIC
LIC

Lower Country
GNI Limit
(US$)

Upper Country
GNI Limit
(US$)

12,055
3,896
996
-

12,055
3,896
995
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Table 2.1: World Bank classification for countries based on income [2].

higher-income countries is usually not feasible due to market regulations, cold-chain logistics restrictions,
and differences in immunization schedules.
Despite the positive effect of tiered pricing and pooled procurement, pediatric vaccines are not always available and affordable for low-income countries. The World Health Organization (WHO [8]) claimed that 19.5
million infants did not have access to essential vaccines in 2018, with 60% of them concentrated in ten lowand middle-income countries [8, 9, 10]. Interruptions to national routine immunization programs due to
COVID-19 could result in more than a million children deaths in African countries [21] unless immunization programs are fully restored, and access to affordable vaccines is strengthened. Beyond the COVID-19
vaccines, lack of access to pediatric vaccines results from multiple reasons, including (1) the vaccine supply
by volume is highly concentrated in a limited number of producers [5]; (2) the monetary value of the vaccine
market is concentrated on sales to high-income countries; (3) logistics factors affect vaccine distribution and
increase costs; (4) weak local immunization programs; (5) political turmoil disrupting immunization campaigns; and (6) low national health investments.
This study considers a hypothetical and partially coordinated pediatric vaccine market where demand for
multiple antigens is met via a single tender1 . In this pediatric global vaccine market, multiple coordinating
entities procure doses on behalf of countries grouped into market segments based on their income level. In
contrast to UNICEF’s and PAHO’s single-price markets, it is assumed that each coordinating entity can have
multiple price levels per vaccine. The entities make vaccine procurement decisions that foster an affordable
and profitable vaccine market by determining the optimal amount of vaccines to buy for each market segment
in their cohort of countries and the range of affordable prices that ensure a desired profitability for the
producers. We consider a vaccine to be affordable to a market segment if its price per dose is lower than the
average willingness-to-pay for the vaccine among the countries in the market segment. Furthermore, it is
assumed that the coordinating entities are trusted intermediaries that seek no financial benefit for themselves
1

An antigen is a substance that provokes an immune response to a particular disease. (e.g., polio vaccines offer antigens that
induce a response to Polio viruses. Combination vaccines such as DTP offer antigens against Diphtheria, Tetanus, and Pertussis in
a single dose)
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and do not cooperate with each other in making their procuring recommendations.
Considering that during a procuring cycle (e.g., a year), non-cooperative entities buy vaccines to clear their
markets’ antigen demands, we assume that producers make their profit from a sequence of negotiations with
the coordinating entities. This procuring sequence is important since a successful negotiation reduces the
available supply for other entities in subsequent negotiations. Furthermore, producers can offer discounts
to push inventory, also affecting subsequent procurement decisions. In this study, the coordinating entities’
procuring order is based on the average income level of their represented countries. We explore an ascending
and a descending procuring order.
We consider that the investment costs to manufacture vaccines are annualized. These costs incorporate a
desired return on investment, high enough to cover the research, development, and manufacturing fixed
costs of the commercialized vaccine products. Under a market with non-cooperative coordinating entities,
it is assumed that producers can follow two policies to recover their annualized fixed costs: (1) offering
discounts on vaccines whose supply has been partially sold to other entities, and (2) offering no discounts.
The discount is based on the revenue still necessary to meet the desired return on investment for each
producer.
We consider a global vaccine market that buys vaccines to clear its demand once a year and investigate the
effects on the global affordability and profit of four relevant factors: (1) the number of market segments in
which countries are grouped, (2) the number of coordinating entities in the global vaccine market, (3) the
order those coordinating entities follow to buy vaccines, and (4) whether producers push their products via
discounts.
To address the effect of those factors, we extend the mathematical framework proposed by Proano et al.
[18], which determines vaccine procurement plans for a globally coordinated vaccine market with a single
coordinating entity. We enrich this framework to handle a fragmented global vaccine market where multiple
entities can make non-cooperative procurement decisions. The framework proposed in this study permits
exploring the isolated effect of a varying level of procurement cooperation among numerous coordinating
entities.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 reviews relevant literature on pediatric vaccine pricing
and group buying studies. Section 2.3 describes the mathematical model and the three-stage optimization
process, the experimental framework, and the performance metrics used in this study. Section 2.5 describes
the experimental data and the study’s results. Finally, Section 2.6 offers a discussion and relevant extensions.
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Literature Review

In this section, we review the literature on group buying and mathematical modeling on pediatric vaccine
pricing. Although there is abundant literature on general group buying and its effects on tiered pricing
[22, 23, 24, 25], we are unaware of studies considering group buying for vaccines. Vaccine pricing studies
that rely on mathematical programming models have focused on the pricing of a new vaccine into a single
competitive market, or its logistic distribution within that market [26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31]. Proano et al.
[18] proposes a mathematical programming model and a three-stage optimization-based process to explore
a hypothetically coordinated vaccine market where the number of vaccines to buy and their prices maximize
affordability and profit. From an economic perspective, several studies question the mechanisms through
which pediatric vaccines are sold and how they affect their affordability [32, 33, 34, 35]. Studies on vaccine
pricing based on cost-benefit analysis vary broadly and without consensus, highlighting the difficulty of
valuing preventive care and saving lives over multiple regions [36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41].
The group buying literature relies on pool procurement to affect affordability and profit considering unlimited supplies, a single product, a producer, and an online mediator that charges membership fees to allow
customers access to price discounts [22, 23, 24, 25]. These assumptions are used in modeling frameworks
that capture the relationship between order quantities, price, and the benefit of joining a group. Those assumptions may not adequately fit the characteristics of the vaccine market, which has no membership fees
to access discounted prices. In a global vaccine market, countries need to meet other criteria to be eligible
in a group, such as being part of a geographical region or having specific income levels.
Hu et al. [22] assumes that a set of customers can be coordinated into group buying entities negotiating online
deals with a single seller. The study deals specifically with sequencing buyers, as the negotiating order can
affect whether or not there is enough demand to justify the deal. Hu et al. [22] relies on game theory
to model the interaction between customers and the seller, considering a sequence of discrete interaction
periods, in which several customers may choose independently. Buyers from Hu et al. [22] have the option
of not satisfying their demand or choosing outside sources not represented in the model.
Under a general coordinated group-buying framework, Yang et al. [23] studies the conditions that might
make it more advantageous for sellers to serve each participating buyer in a given market. The study assumes
that the seller can obtain other business if the entities refuse to negotiate.
Chen and Roma [24] models group-buying through a three-step process involving producers, retailers, and
buyers. Retailers can choose whether to cooperate with a group-buying entity or not. Assuming a linear
demand, Chen and Roma [24] suggests that group-buying might be more advantageous to smaller, less
powerful retailers than to bigger ones under a non-cooperative environment.
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Anand and Aron [25] considers group-buying mechanisms for a monopoly on web-based transactions under
uncertain demand. Customer product valuations are uncertain and unknown. However, demand uncertainties
may not hold for the vaccine market [42]. Any variations in purchased quantities are more likely to come
from changes in available budgets, existing stockpile levels, reaction to outbreaks, logistical issues, and
political instabilities than from birth rate changes. Hence, there are little changes in the number of doses
necessary for full immunization of a country from one year to the next.
Game theory models have been the core of several studies on vaccine pricing decision problems [26, 27,
28, 29, 30]. These studies have focused on the impact of new vaccines in a single market, ignoring the
implications of potential buyer coordination.
Robbins et al. [28] uses a game theory model to frame the US vaccine market as an oligopoly of asymmetric
producers in a Bertrand competition where each producer can supply the entire market. The paper proposes a
mathematical approach to capture oligopolistic interactions for the US market that result in different pricing
strategies.
Other studies address vaccine pricing through mathematical programming models [43, 44, 45, 46], assuming
a central planner for the US market without considering supply limitations. Additional studies have focused
on determining how combination vaccines fit the overall schedule for the US market under a central planner
[47, 48, 49, 50]. One study addressing low- and lower-middle-income countries specifically proposes a
general model for vaccine distribution within a country, but does not consider pricing [31].
Proano et al. [18] proposes an optimization-based methodology to model pricing coordination between
different market segments and producers in the global pediatric vaccine market when a single coordinating
entity acts as a decision-maker to improve affordability and profit simultaneously. Countries are grouped
in market segments to procure vaccines from multiple producers via a single trusted intermediary who
determines procuring quantities and prices that are affordable and profitable. The procurement is done via
a synchronized multi-antigen tender. The feasible prices satisfy tiered pricing constraints, ensure a desired
profitability to the producers, and are lower than the market’s reservation prices (RP). Proano et al. [18]
shows that it is possible to price vaccines affordably for all coordinated market segments (including highincome markets) when the supply of combination vaccines is available to all market segments. Additionally,
Proano et al. [18] shows that the total social surplus (i.e., the total welfare resulting from aggregating savings
and profit) is a consequence of the choice and volume of vaccines procured.
Considering a hypothetically coordinated vaccine market with a single entity, Mosquera [51] extends Proano
et al. [18] to evaluate the effect on profits and affordability when grouping countries into a varying number of
market segments (2, 4, 8, 12), and considering uncertainty on the vaccines’ reservation prices and different
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rates on the producers return of investment. Mosquera [51] concludes that grouping countries into more
market segments improves the affordability of low-income countries while decreasing the profits of vaccine
producers. However, by increasing the number of market segments in which low- and low-middle-income
countries are grouped while decreasing the number of market segments for upper-middle- and high-income
countries, one could expand affordability for low-income countries without affecting profit levels, or making
vaccines prohibitively expensive for the high-income countries (i.e., vaccines remain priced below each
market’s reservation price). Mosquera [51] also shows that uncertainty in reservation prices and the return
on investment rates do not have a significant effect on affordability.
This study differentiates from Proano et al. [18] and Mosquera [51] by modeling market dynamics of having
multiple non-cooperative coordinating entities that compete to secure higher savings for their countries and
try to maintain a profitable market. The proposed framework allows controlling two effects absent in the
Proano et al. [18] and Mosquera [51] studies: the order of procurement, and the way producers adjust their
investment expectations after negotiating with each entity.
Several studies have focused on Gavi, an existing coordinating entity for the vaccine market, and its impact
on countries when they are no longer eligible for its financial support[1, 52, 53]. Saxenian et al. [52]
evaluates the readiness of 16 countries if they stop receiving financial assistance from Gavi as they graduate,
concluding that the incremental financial load on graduating countries may provoke these countries to cancel
or scale down immunization programs and face issues with their vaccine supply [52], potentially decreasing
their coverage levels.
Frontieres [32] discusses how the GNI-based tiered pricing does not guarantee higher affordability on its
own and might instead limit access to vaccines that become prohibitively expensive when jumping from
low-income prices to lower-middle-income prices. This criticism is supported by Moon et al. [33], claiming
that tiered pricing may overburden middle-income countries in an unsustainable manner while incentivizing
producers to focus on the higher profits obtained from high-income markets.

2.3

Methodology

This study proposes the Group Vaccine Allocation (GVA) model, a three-stage mathematical programming
framework, to optimize the procurement decisions of a coordinating entity at a time. We apply GVA to
an ordered set of coordinating entities as part of a multi-stage experimental approach to test the influence
on affordability and profit of four factors: (F1) the number of market segments in which 194 countries
are grouped; (F2) the number of coordinating entities facilitating procurement in the global market; (F3)
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the order followed by the entities in negotiating their procurement plans; and (F4) the producers’ decision
of adjusting or not their minimum prices to recover their return on investment. Each experimental factor
has multiple levels. For each experimental instance, we create multiple replications by randomizing the
vaccines’ reservation prices in each market segment. For each of these experimental instances, the GVA
problem is sequentially solved for each coordinating entity following a procuring order. After solving the
GVA for each entity, the overall antigen demand and vaccine supply are adjusted to account for the entity’s
purchases.
The GVA iteratively solves a sequence of three optimization problems. For each entity in the current round
of negotiation, the first stage determines vaccine quantities that maximize the total social surplus of all
market segments served by the entity. This total social surplus aggregates the overall savings and profits.
The second stage determines a lower bound on the prices for the procured vaccines that maintain the optimal
total social surplus, and the third stage determines their upper bounds. Prices per dose between these bounds
also maximize the total social surplus. The lower-bound prices correspond to the most affordable and least
profitable vaccine prices per dose, while the upper-bound prices correspond to the least affordable and
most profitable prices. The GVA ensures that these prices are lower than the reservation prices for each
vaccine at each entity’s market segments. Without loss of generality, the GVA is solved for a single-year
procurement cycle, assuming that all countries in a global market are served by coordinating entities that
make procurement decisions on their behalf.

2.3.1

GVA: Group Vaccine Allocation Model

Through its three stages, the GVA determines a vaccine procurement plan and the feasible range of prices
per dose that maximizes savings for the entity’s market segments and profits for the vaccine producers (i.e.,
the total social surplus). The following notation and formulation describe the GVA:
Sets:
B: set of vaccines
A: set of antigens offered through immunization
E: set of coordinating entities
M : set of all market segments
Me : set of market segments that procure through coordinating entity e ∈ E
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P : set of vaccine producers
Ba1 : set of vaccines offering antigen a ∈ A
Qb : sets of vaccines that together offer the same antigen protection as vaccine b ∈ B, and are fabricated
by the same producer.
Nq : vaccines in each subset q ∈ Qb .
Lt : set of all countries that qualify as t ∈ { low-income (LIC) , lower-middle-income (LMIC), uppermiddle-income (UMIC), high-income (HIC) }
Parameters:
Rbm : Reservation price of vaccine b ∈ B in market segment m ∈ M . The maximum price per dose that the
market m ∈ M is willing to pay for vaccine b ∈ B. Rbm corresponds to the average reservation price
of countries in market m.
lm : Average birth cohort per year in market m ∈ M .
Cb : Annualized production, research and development fixed costs necessary to manufacture vaccine b ∈
B, considering a desired rate of return.
dam : Number of doses of antigen a ∈ A needed to immunize a child in market m ∈ M according to the
market’s immunization schedule.
Dbm : Maximum number of doses of vaccine b ∈ B. allowed per child in market segment m ∈ M to avoid
over-immunization (i.e., to avoid that children receive more doses than recommended for any of the
antigens vaccine provided by vaccine b ∈ B).
Sb : Total supply of vaccine b ∈ B
sb : Remaining supply of vaccine b ∈ B at the current round of negotiations.
gnim : Average gross national income (GNI) per capita among the countries in market segment m ∈ M
αbm : Scaling factor that increases the price per dose of vaccine b ∈ B for market segment m ∈ M when
purchase quantities are smaller than the available supply. It is part of an elasticity constraint incentivizing larger purchases with revenue closer to the return on investment.
ub : Minimum price paid for a dose of vaccine b ∈ B
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ψ: Monetary penalty for every unmet dose of vaccine demand.
η: Monetary penalty for producing vaccines that do not add social surplus. η prevents plans in which a
P
vaccine is produced (gb = 1) but not bought ( m∈M Xbm = 0). In the numerical example, η = 1.
Variables:
Xbm : Quantity of vaccine b ∈ B to be purchased by market segment m ∈ M
Ybm : Price paid for vaccine b ∈ B in market segment m ∈ M
gb : Binary variable indicating whether b ∈ B is being produced (i.e., gb = 1) or not (i.e., gb = 0)

Stage 1: Maximizing Total Social Surplus (TSS)
For each entity e ∈ E :

Max

X,Y,g

X X

Rbm Xbm −

b∈B m∈Me

X

P
Cb

b∈B

m∈Me Xbm
Sb



!
−ψ

X X

dam lm −

a∈A m∈Me


X
b∈Ba1

Xbm  − η

X

gb

b∈B

(2.1)
s.t. Ybm + (1 − gb )

X

∀ b ∈ B, q ∈ Qb : ||Qb || ≥ 1

(2.2)

∀ b∈B

(2.3)

∀ b ∈ B, m ∈ Me : sb > 0

(2.4)

Ybm ≤ Rbm gb

∀ b ∈ B, m ∈ Me

(2.5)

Ybm ≥ gb ub
X
Xbm ≤ dam lm

∀ b ∈ B, m ∈ Me

(2.6)

∀ a ∈ A, m ∈ Me

(2.7)

Xbm ≤ Dbm lm

∀ b ∈ B, m ∈ Me

(2.8)

Xbm ≥ 0

∀ b ∈ B, m ∈ Me

(2.9)

gb = {0, 1}

∀b∈B

t∈Nq

X

Rtm ≥

X

Ytm

t∈Nq

Xbm ≤ sb gb

m∈Me



Ybm


(sb gb − Xbm )αbm
Cb
≥
+ gb
Sb
Sb

b∈Ba1

(2.10)

In Stage 1, the mixed integer programming model described above determines all procurement quantities,
Xbm , of vaccine b in each of the market segments m ∈ Me of entity e that maximize total social surplus,
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penalizes not meeting antigen demands, and result in the lowest number of vaccine choices.
We define
P
 the
P
P
P
m∈Me Xbm
for
total social surplus as the sum of the total profits
b∈B
m∈Me Xbm Ybm −
b∈B Cb
 Sb
P
P
producers and the total savings for the market segments
b∈B
m∈Me (Rbm − Ybm )Xbm .
In the non-cooperative scenario, producers’ revenue is generated from sequential negotiations between the
producers and the coordinating entities. Therefore, the fraction of annualized fixed costs covered from
vaccine sales can only be determined after all the entity negotiations have been completed. Additionally,
GVA’s Stage 1 model considers that the price per dose decreases linearly as procurement quantities increase
and that failing to meet demand is possible but intensely penalized.
Since we aim to increase affordability for target low-income countries, the objective function in (2.1) simultaneously maximizes total social surplus for an entity’s negotiation, and through penalty multipliers, minimizes gaps in meeting its vaccine demands. The total social surplus contribution from each entity considers
the fraction
fixed costs corresponding to the number of vaccines bought in the current
 Pof the annualized

m∈M Xbm
iteration
. The closer the purchase of a vaccine is to its total supply, the higher the proportion
Sb
of the fixed costs covered by the entity. The objective also minimizes
the vaccine purchases


 P the gap between
P
and the entity’s market segments’ demands. The penalty term ψ a∈A,m∈M dam lm − b∈Ba1 Xbm in
objective (2.1) allows for small gaps in meeting demands that otherwise would render the problem infeasible. Together, the penalty term in the objective function (2.1) and constraint (2.7) ensure that the procured
vaccine quantities closely meet the markets’ antigen demands, penalizing unmet demands. We use ψ = 106
in our numerical experiments to ensure that our solutions fulfill as much of the demand as possible (i.e.,
we prioritize meeting the demand of vaccines over profits or savings). The last term in (2.1) minimizes the
number of vaccine types used in the entity’s procurement plan. Note that any value of η > 0 would be
sufficient to induce the desired behavior. In our numerical example, we use η = 1.
Constraint (2.2) ensures that the price negotiated for a combination vaccine is higher than the sum of multiple vaccines from the same producer offering similar antigen protection (e.g., the price of a vaccine containing antigens for diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis (DTP) and hepatitis B is higher than buying separate vaccines
against hepatitis B and DTP from the same producer.)
Constraint (2.3) ensures that purchases do not exceed the available vaccine supply in that round of negotiations.
In a scenario where coordinating entities do not cooperate, vaccine producers cannot guarantee that the
annualized R&D and production fixed costs are fully recovered until the vaccine quantities sold to all markets
are known. Thus, under a non-cooperative scenario, decisions are unveiled iteratively for each coordinating
entity without having a full picture of the purchases made by other coordinating entities.
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Constraint (2.4) induces economies of scale by adjusting prices per dose based on the purchased volume.
If a vaccine negotiated in previous rounds still has available supply, the constraint incentivizes coordinating
entities negotiating in the current round to buy as many doses as possible. If the entire supply of a vaccine
is bought, constraint (2.4) guarantees the price per dose is low but sufficient to cover the annualized fixed
costs (i.e., Ybm ≥

Cb
Sb ).

When purchasing less than the entire available supply, sb , prices increase by a factor

αbm to mitigate the risk that producers will not recover their fixed costs in following entity negotiations. The
Sb
value of αbm is given by (αb m = Rbm C
− 1) and ensures that vaccine prices remain between the lowest
b

level that covers their fixed cost and their reservation prices (i.e.,

Cb
Sb

≤ Ybm ≤ Rbm .)

Constraint (2.5) guarantees that the negotiated prices do not exceed the reservation prices for each vaccine in
each market segment. Constraint (2.6) forces prices per dose to be above a pre-established minimum (in our
numerical example, we use ub = $0.20 ∀ b ∈ B) [1, 54]. Constraint (2.7) guarantees that the coordinating
entities do not buy more vaccines than their demand. Constraint (2.8) prevents that the optimal vaccine
purchases for a market segment exceed its needs.

Stage 2: Maximizing Total Customer Surplus (TCS)
For each entity e ∈ E:
Max
Y

subject to

TCS:

X X

∗
(Rbm − Ybm ) Xbm

(2.11)

b∈B m∈Me

Constraints (2.2), (2.4), (2.5), (2.6)

In Stage 2, for each entity e, a linear programming model maximizes the savings that the entity’s market
segments can obtain by procuring vaccines at prices lower than their average reservation prices (i.e., the
market’s reservation price), considering as inputs the vaccine quantities resulting from the solution of the
Stage 1 problem. The Stage 2 problem establishes a lower bound on vaccine prices that maintain the optimal
total social surplus from Stage 1, at prices that are profitable to the producers, while the market segments
can extract as much customer surplus (CS) as possible. Given that profits can only be calculated once all
coordinating entities complete their negotiations, this stage’s model determines vaccine prices that facilitate
securing the desired return on investment from entity e’s procuring decisions at Stage 1.
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Stage 3: Maximizing Total Profits, (TPF)
For entity e ∈ E :
Max
Y

subject to

TPF:

X X
b∈B m∈Me

∗
Ybm Xbm

−

X

Cb gb∗

P

m∈Me

b∈B

∗
Xbm

Sb

(2.12)

Constraints (2.2), (2.4), (2.5), (2.6)

In Stage 3, a similar linear programming model maximizes profits for the vaccine allocations resulting from
Stage 1 for entity e. This LP formulation establishes an upper bound on the vaccine prices that maintain the
optimized total social surplus from Stage 1 without exceeding the reservation prices beyond Rbm .
It is assumed that all market segments can purchase any vaccine. Table 2.2 summarizes the constraints
enforced at each stage of the GVA for an entity and a problem instance.
While in a fully cooperative market, it is possible to estimate the global profit. In a non-cooperative framework with a sequential procurement process, it is not trivial to determine how much of the fixed costs are
covered by negotiating with each coordinating entity. For this reason, the objective function (2.12) is similar to (2.4) but considers that the annualized fixed costs are proportional to the fraction of the supply sold
to the entity. However, notice that total profits cannot be estimated until all entities have completed their
procurement; hence, we also report on the actual revenue per market segment during the experimentation.
Finally, any remaining supply left over after each entity negotiation round remains available for subsequent
coordinating entities.
The feasible region ((2.2)-(2.10)) for the Stage 1 problem of a coordinated fully cooperative framework
is less restrictive than the feasible region of a non-cooperative framework, given that the latter is solved
iteratively for each coordinating entity. Hence, the total social surplus of a cooperative framework is an
upper bound to any non-cooperative one. The results of Stages 2 and 3 depend on the procurement plans
determined in Stage 1, thus their feasible regions are not necessarily the same for the cooperative and noncooperative frameworks (e.g., a vaccine purchase that serves the globally optimal social surplus might not
be chosen by coordinating entities optimizing only their own subset of market segments). Therefore, it is
possible for the non-cooperative negotiation to extract more total customer surplus or total profits than a
cooperative system, as long as their total social surplus remains lower than in the cooperative framework.
After the GVA has been applied to all entities, the overall profit corresponds to the revenue obtained from
sales to all entities minus the annualized fixed costs for all procured vaccines. When a vaccine yields a
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negative profit even at the highest acceptable prices for the optimal procurement plan, producing the vaccine
is not financially sustainable. Similarly, if the profit is positive even at the lowest prices, the vaccine is
guaranteed to do financially well.

Stage

Variables

Objective Function

Constraints

1
2
3

Xbm , Ybm , gb
Ybm
Ybm

(2.1)
(2.11)
(2.12)

(2.2), (2.3), (2.4), (2.5), (2.6), (2.7), (2.8), (2.9), (2.10)
(2.2), (2.4), (2.5), (2.6)
(2.2), (2.4), (2.5), (2.6)

Table 2.2: Decision variables and constraints used in each stage problem.

2.3.2

Experimental Framework

We design experimental scenarios by controlling four key factors: (F1) the number of market segments in
which 194 countries are grouped; (F2) the number of coordinating entities facilitating procurement in the
global market; (F3) the order followed by the entities in negotiating their procurement plans; and (F4) the
producers’ decision of adjusting or not their minimum prices to recover their return on investment. Table
2.3 summarizes the experimental scenarios tested to answer the research questions.
For factor (F1), 194 countries are grouped into 2, 4, 8, or 12 different market segments based on the similarity
of their average GNI per capita, gnim . The market segments are then ranked based on their average income
per capita and assigned to coordinating entities so that all entities make decisions for an equal number of
market segments. For example, in a scenario with 2 coordinating entities and 12 market segments, the first
coordinating entity would be responsible for the 6 market segments with the highest gnim , and the second
coordinating entity would be assigned the 6 market segments with the lowest gnim .
Factor (F2) allows the number of non-cooperative coordinating entities to vary in six levels (1, 2, 3, 4, 6,
12). Under an equal distribution of market segments per entity, if the number of market segments is 12, the
numbers of markets per entity decreases (12, 6, 4, 3, 2, and 1) as the number of entities increases (1, 2, 3,
Factors
F1:
F2:
F3:
F4:

Levels

Number of market segments
Number of coordinating entities
Coordinating entities procurement order
Fixed cost recovering policies

2

4
1
2
3
Ascending income
Adjusted

Table 2.3: Experimental factors and levels

8
12
4
6
12
Descending income
Invariant
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4, 6, and 12). The maximum number of entities used per experimental scenario is equal to the number of
market segments. The case when a single coordinating entity serves all market segments is considered a
benchmark scenario. Hence, there is a benchmark scenario for each number of markets segments in which
countries are clustered.
For factor (F3), the coordinating entities’ procurement order can be ascending or descending based on the
average wealth of their market segments (i.e., gnim ). In practice, high-income market countries are the first
ones to make purchases and secure vaccine access, which is captured by a descending procuring order. The
descending procuring order may be favored by producers, given their need to secure profit rapidly, while the
ascending order incentivizes large volume purchases to be secured first.
For factor (F4), producers follow either an ‘adjusted’ or ‘invariant’ pricing policy. As stated earlier, producers estimate a minimum price per vaccine dose considering the annualized fixed R&D production costs to
be recovered. With an ‘adjusted’ policy, if part of a vaccine’s supply has been sold to some coordinating
entities, the producers adjust their vaccine prices for subsequent negotiations to help them meet their annualized fixed costs goals. This is achieved by updating the value of the annuity to be recovered after each
entity negotiation, as shown in Algorithm 1, consequently changing the bounds of Constraint (2.4). In the
‘invariant’ policy, at the beginning of the procuring cycle, producers estimate the minimum price needed to
recover the entire annualized fixed costs, which remains fixed during the procurement sequence.
The four factor level combinations results in 60 experimental scenarios. For each scenario, we randomize
each vaccine’s reservation prices (at each market) from 90% to 110% of their baseline reservation prices.
Vaccines for which no historical data was available had their reservation prices estimated as a function of
each market segment’s income, as well as of the historical price of other vaccines offering similar antigens,
as described in Mosquera [51]. When randomizing reservation prices, the dollar value of vaccines bought
at their reservation prices changes. Thus, reporting affordability, profits, and surplus in absolute terms is
affected by aleatorization. Hence, we define the market value (MV) as the sum of the highest theoretical
total customer surplus and the highest theoretical total profits. We present our metrics of interest with respect
to the MV to ensure that our results take into account the the relative gains in profit, affordability, and surplus
for each data instance.
For each experimental scenario, we generate one thousand random instances of the vaccine reservation
prices. For each random instance, we iteratively solve the GVA three-stage optimization process for each
procuring entity as illustrated in Algorithm 1 and summarized in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: Illustrative diagram of the methodology adopted to compare the effect of each combination of
levels for the 4 selected factors (i.e., each scenario). The upstream arrows are followed once all iterations of
each set have been resolved (e.g., only after all coordinating entities have finished negotiating the process
continues to the next scenario to be tested).

2.3.3

Output Metrics

For all experimental scenarios, we monitor the following metrics:
• the aggregated profits for the producers,
• the aggregated savings for all market segments, and
• savings and revenue generated by LIC, LMIC, UMIC, and HIC (based on the World Bank classification) as they are grouped in different market segments.
A market’s savings in procuring a vaccine (i.e., customer surplus) is reported by the difference between
the market’s reservation price and the mid-price between the lower and upper price bounds determined in
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Algorithm 1 Solution Procedure
1: for each coordinating entity e ∈ E do
2:
Solve the GVA
3:
Determine which vaccines to produce
4:
Determine vaccine quantities to buy for each market segment m ∈ Me
5:
Define upper and lower price bounds per vaccine dose
6:
for every vaccine b ∈ B do
7:
if Adjusted policy is used then
8:
Update remaining fixed cost: Cb ← Cb minus revenue obtained from selling b ∈ B to
m ∈ Me
9:
Update available supply: sb ← sb minus volume of b purchased by m ∈ Me
10: Collect output metrics.

Stages 2 and 3 of the GVA process. Given that the price countries are willing to pay is randomized for each
experimental scenario, the dollar value of the global vaccine market is also random. Hence, we normalize
our metrics over the market dollar value of each experimental instance. Table 2.4 summarizes the set of
metrics used in this study. Appendix 2.6 offers additional details on the experimental results, including
the number of producers who do not cover annualized fixed costs for their vaccines, the number of times a
market segment does not satisfy all of its antigen demand, savings, and revenue per country.
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Metric

Description

Total Customer
Surplus (T CS)

Mathematical Expression

Savings received from the vaccine
procurement of all market segments

XX X

of all coordinating entities

e∈E b∈B m∈Me

(Rbm − Ybm ) Xbm

The total monetary value in the vaccine market. Sum of maximum posMarket
(M V )

Value

sible customer savings for the most
affordable feasible prices and maxi-

T CS +

X X X

(Xbm Ybm − Cb gb )

e∈E m∈Me b∈B

mum possible profit with most profitable feasible prices.
T CS
MV

Total customer surplus across all entities as a fraction of the market value.

T CS
MV

Customer surplus in market segment
t ∈
CSt
MV

(low-income, lower-middle-

income, upper-middle-income, high-

XX X

(Rbm − Ybm ) Xbm

e∈E b∈B m∈Lt
MV

income) as a fraction of the market
value.
TPF
MV

X X

Total profit across all entities as a
fraction of the market value.

X  b∈B m∈Me



e∈E

(Xbm .Ybm − Cb gb )
MV






Total social surplus across all entities
T SS
MV

X X

as a fraction of the market value when
customer surplus and profits are calculated at the same price point.

X  b∈B m∈Me



e∈E

(Xbm .Rbm − Cb gb )
MV






Table 2.4: Variables used as performance metrics and their explanations.

2.4

Experimental Data

This study considers a vaccine market consisting of 14 producers offering 52 vaccines to satisfy demands for
6 different antigens (Hib: Haemophilus Influenza type B, HepB: Hepatitis B, DTP: Diphtheria Tetanus and
Pertussis, V: Varicella, MMR: Measles, Mumps and Rubella, and IPV: Polio) (see Table 2.5); 194 countries
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are grouped by their GNI per capita into market segments for tier-pricing purposes. Rather than having only
the usual 4-tier market segmentation (i.e., high-income, upper-middle-income, lower-middle-income and
low-income countries based on the World Bank classification [2]), we rank countries in descending order by
their GNI per capita and group them in either 2, 4, 8, or 12 market segments (see Table 2.6). Consequently,
each vaccine has a different average reservation price in each market segment, depending on the countries in
the market segment. Without a loss of generality, in this study, all variations of diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis
vaccines and all polio vaccines are considered to offer the same type of antigens and are represented by DTP
and IPV, respectively.
Producer ID
1
2

3

4
5

6

7

8

Vaccine ID

Antigens in the Vaccine

6

HepB

41

DTP, HepB and Hib

20

IPV

1

DTP

7

HepB

32

DTP and HepB

42

DTP, HepB and Hib

2

DTP

43

DTP, HepB and Hib

8

HepB

14

Hib

3

DTP

9

HepB

15

Hib

21

IPV

25

MMR

29

V

33

DTP and HepB

38

DTP and IPV

44

DTP, HepB and Hib

49

DTP, HepB and IPV

51

DTP, HepB, Hib and IPV

10

HepB

45

DTP, HepB and Hib

11

HepB

16

Hib
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Producer ID

Vaccine ID

Antigens in the Vaccine

26

MMR

30

V

39

HepB and Hib

40

MMR and V

17

Hib

35

DTP and Hib

46

DTP, HepB and Hib

4

DTP

18

Hib

22

IPV

27

MMR

31

V

36

DTP and Hib

50

DTP, Hib and IPV

52

DTP, HepB, Hib and IPV

5

DTP

12

HepB

19

Hib

23

IPV

28

MMR

34

DTP and HepB

37

DTP and Hib

47

DTP, HepB and Hib

13

13

HepB

14

24

IPV

9
10

11

12

24

Table 2.5: Vaccines in each producer portfolio. Vaccines and producers are referred by their study IDs.
Antigens in each vaccine correspond to: (Hib= Haemophilus influenzae type B, DTP= Diphtheria-TetanusPertussis, HepB=Hepatitis B, V=varicella, MMR=Measles-Mumps-Rubella, IPV= inactivated polio). Data
was aggregated from WHO’s V3P repository, 2018 [3].
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Number of market
segments

12

8

4

2
1

Market
IDs
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1
2
3
4
1
2
1

segment

25

Country IDs assigned to
the market segment
1 to 5
6 to 26
27 to 57
58 to 65
66 to 75
76 to 109
110 to 113
114 to 134
135 to 158
159 to 172
173 to 191
192 to 194
1 and 2
3 to 57
58 to 65
66 to 109
110 to 123
124 to 158
159 to 180
181 to 194
1 to 57
58 to 109
110 to 158
159 to 194
1 to 131
132 to 194
1 to 194

Table 2.6: Country-to-market segment assignment based on the number of market segments in the experimental scenarios. Country 1 correspond to the country with highest gnim based on the World Bank
classification, while country 194 corresponds to the one with lowest gnim

2.5

Results

For each of the 60 experimental scenarios resulting from exploring all factors and levels, we compare key
metrics to a benchmark in which all market segments receive procurement recommendations from a single
coordinating entity. As a result, there is a different benchmark for each number of market segments in which
the global vaccine market is divided (i.e., 2, 4, 8, or 12). Each benchmark mimics a fully coordinated system
for a given number of market segments in which there is no need to follow any procurement order nor adjust
the recovery of the annualized fixed costs, and all tenders are synchronized.
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For clarity and brevity, and without loss of generality, this section contrasts the results collected for experimental scenarios with countries grouped in 12 market segments. Results for scenarios with 2, 4 and 8 market
segments are available in Appendix 2.6, and ratify the trends described in this section. The output metrics
are computed considering the mid-point prices between the lowest and highest feasible prices per dose for
each vaccine in each market segment.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the Total Social Surplus as a fraction of the dollar value of the global market ( TMSS
V )
for each experimental instance. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 illustrate the Total Customer Surplus ( TMCS
V ) and Total
Profit ( TMPVF ) considering the mid-point prices of the feasible price range resulting from the three-stage
optimization process. Figures 2.5 to 2.12 illustrate the customer surplus and revenue for specific market
segments grouped into the World Bank classification as low-, lower-middle-, upper-middle- and high-income
countries.

Figure 2.2: Aggregated TMSS
V for a global vaccine market with 12 market segments, for a varying number of
coordinating entities, different procurement priority orders, and different fixed cost recovery policies. The
horizontal line corresponds to the baseline scenario with a single coordinating entity. For all scenarios, TMSS
V
increases as the number of entities decreases. Other factors have smaller impact, but descending order with
invariant pricing policy dominates.
Figure 2.2 shows that total social surplus ( TMSS
V ) increases as the number of coordinating entities decreases,
or – since the number of market segments is equally distributed by the number of entities in each experiment
– as the number of market segments handled by each entity increases. These results illustrate that the
T SS
MV ,

and hence the global market’s aggregated affordability and profit expand when the market is more

cooperative (i.e., fewer coordinating entities), and when entities leverage on tiered pricing opportunities by
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coordinating a large number of market segments. As discussed in section 2.3, this is an expected result given
the less restrictive nature of a fully cooperative coordinated negotiation. Scenarios with an invariant pricing
policy had higher TSS than those with an adjusted policy.

Figure 2.3: Aggregated TMPVF in the global vaccine market with 12 market segments, for a varying number
of coordinating entities, different procurement priorities, and choice of fixed cost recovery policy. The
horizontal line corresponds to the baseline scenario with a single coordinating entity. TMPVF decreases as the
number of entities increase in a similar shape as the TMSS
V .
Figure 2.3 shows that the overall profitability ( TMPVF ) increases as the number of coordinating entities decreases (or equivalently, as the number of markets per entity increases) in a similar trend to the

T SS
MV .

Furthermore, scenarios following ‘descending’ procuring policy mostly dominate those following an ‘ascending’ policy.
Figure 2.4 shows that the overall market affordability (i.e., total customer surplus) increases when there are
more entities, or equivalently, when the number of market segments per entity decreases. When negotiating
for less market segments, the distribution and pricing decisions have to benefit a lesser number of buyers,
and thus may overall offer more savings for all. Additionally, there is little difference in total customer
surplus resulting from adopting an ‘ascending’ or ‘descending’ procuring order.
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Figure 2.4: Aggregated TMCS
V in a global vaccine market with 12 market segments, varying number of coordinating entities, different procurement priorities, and choice of fixed cost recovery policy. The horizontal
line represents the value for the baseline scenario with a single coordinating entity. Unlike Figures 2.2 and
2.3, TMCS
V increases as the number of entities increase, and performs better under an adjusted pricing policy.

Figure 2.5: Revenue obtained from sales to low-income countries (LIC) across all experimental scenarios
for 12 market segments. The horizontal line corresponds to the baseline scenario with a single coordinating
entity. Revenue tends to increase as the number of coordinating entities increases and an ascending procuring
order is used. Under a descending procuring order the revenue insensitive to the number of coordinating
entities.

Bla
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Figure 2.6: Comparison between the revenue obtained from lower-middle-income countries (LMIC) across
all experimental scenarios for 12 market segments. The horizontal line corresponds to the baseline scenario
with a single coordinating entity. Ascending order dominates the descending procuring order.

Figure 2.7: Revenue from sales to upper-middle-income countries (UMIC) across all experimental scenarios
for 12 market segments. The horizontal line corresponds to the baseline scenario with a single coordinating
entity. A descending priority procuring order offers higher revenue from sales to UMIC than an ascending
order.

Bla
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Figure 2.8: Revenue from sales to high-income countries (HIC) across all experimental scenarios for 12
market segments. The horizontal line corresponds to the baseline scenario with a single coordinating entity.
Revenue increases with fewer coordinating entities. The descending order dominates the ascending order,
while the fixed cost recovering policy seems to have little to no effect.

Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show that producers can extract more revenue from sales to LIC and LMIC under
an ascending policy and higher number of coordinating entities. The revenue levels are not significantly
affected by any other factor when the procurement order is descending. The relatively constant revenue seen
in the descending negotiation order suggests that the available vaccines are bought at near reservation price
levels, regardless of the number of coordinating entities.
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for low-income countries (LIC) across all experimental scenarios for 12 market segments.

The horizontal line corresponds to the baseline scenario with a single coordinating entity.

T CS
MV

for LIC is

very sensitive to procuring order. Descending priority provides overall higher TCS, especially with a higher
number of coordinating entities.

Figure 2.10:

T CS
MV

for lower-middle-income countries (LMIC)across all experimental scenarios for 12

market segments. The horizontal line corresponds to the baseline scenario with a single coordinating entity.
T CS
MV

for LMIC improves with a higher number of coordinating entities. The descending procuring order

dominates the ascending procuring order. The choice of fixed cost recovering policy has insignificant effect
on the response.
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The revenue for UMIC and HIC (Figures 2.7 and 2.8) follows the total profit trends (Figure 2.3), where
revenue increases as the number of entities decreases. Sales to markets with higher reservation prices contribute the most to profit gains, even if their sales volume is lower those of other markets (Figures 2.6 and
2.5).

Figure 2.11:

T CS
MV

for upper-middle-income countries (UMIC) across all experimental scenarios for 12

market segments. The horizontal line corresponds to the value for the baseline scenario with a single coordinating entity. Trends with ascending negotiation order for

T CS
MV

in UMIC dominate.

LIC can ensure a modest customer surplus, between 1 and 5% of the MV. Figure 2.9 shows that customer
surplus for LIC decreases with fewer number of entities under a ‘descending’ procuring order. The same
decreasing TCS pattern can be observed for LMIC regardless of procurement order (Figure 2.10). However,
for LIC and LMIC, the descending procuring policy offers more TCS. Figures 2.11 and 2.12 show that for
UMIC and HIC there is an opposite behavior; customer surplus increases as the number of entities decreases,
in particular under the ascending procuring policy.
A low Total Customer Surplus at the market level is not necessarily bad news. The GVA framework ensures
that vaccine prices per dose are lower than the average reservation prices of the countries in each market.
Consequently, in any market segment, it is possible that even when the market secures a positive customer
surplus, for some of its countries the recommended vaccine price is higher than what they can pay. Low
customer surplus at a market level can also result when a market’s recommended prices are closer to its
countries’ reservation prices. This is specially true when the countries in the market segment have similar
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Figure 2.12: TMCS
V for high-incacross all experimental scenarios for 12 market segments. The horizontal
line represents the value for the baseline scenario with a single coordinating entity. Affordability decreases
as the number of coordinating entities increases. Ascending priority dominates results, while there is little
impact when using an adjusted pricing policy

reservation prices; or when countries are grouped in an increasing number of market segments.
Figures 2.13 and 2.14 show the affordability gaps (i.e., the difference between a country’s reservation price
and its market recommended price) for LICs, for ascending and descending procurement orders under adjusted prices (Figure 2.9 illustrates the market customer surplus for these scenarios.) Figures 2.13 and 2.14
show that although the TCS/MV decreases for a single coordinating entity, the affordability gaps are less
dispersed, and less negative when segmentation per entity increases (i.e., cooperation increases). In these
figures, the interquartile ranges in the boxplots are narrower, although the whisker lengths and outliers increase. Thus, increasing cooperation makes countries pay closer to their reservation prices and reduces the
number of countries paying more than their reservation prices.
A practical implication of these results is that, given enough supply, organizations procuring on behalf of
lower-income countries can redirect customer surplus to target countries even by procuring after higherincome market segments. Additionally, these organization should group their participating countries in as
many market segments as possible and start procurement negotiations sequentially, in descending order,
starting with market segments that have higher gnim . This implies that as long as producers offer discounts
for high-volume purchases and demand is elastic in price, organizations such as UNICEF can benefit from
scheduling their tenders after markets with higher income levels, and organize the participating countries
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Figure 2.13: Savings per dose across all vaccines for low-income countries for a 12 market scenario with
with 1 and 12 coordinating entities, following an ascending procuring order and an adjusted fixed cost
recovering policy. Different colors represent different market segments.

Figure 2.14: Savings per dose across all vaccines for low-income countries for a 12 market scenario, with 1
and 12 coordinating entities, following a descending procuring order and an adjusted fixed cost recovering
policy. Different colors represent different market segments.
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internally into multiple market segments, rather than considering them part of a single-price market for LICs
and LMICs.

2.6

Conclusions

Our results suggest that under a non-cooperative vaccine market, there are opportunities to concentrate
savings on LIC and LMIC and generate profit from sales to UMIC and HIC while maintaining affordable
prices for all countries, regardless of their income level. This study suggests that affordability at the market
level for low-income and lower-middle-income countries can be improved by having more coordinating
entities dealing with LIC countries, or effectively having a coordinating entity for LIC countries organized
in a high number of market segments that procure sequentially. However, producers would see lower profit
levels when negotiating with multiple coordinating entities, mostly due to a revenue decrease from highand upper-middle-income countries despite of revenue gains from sales to LIC.
Additionally, comparing the fixed costs recovering policies, adjusting the annualized fixed-cost expenses
based on the volume of vaccines that remain to sell is less effective than an ‘invariant’ policy. Furthermore,
ordering the entities by descending GNI helps prevent losses for producers by extracting higher revenue
from higher-income countries.
The trend in Figure 2.9 suggests that to increase customer surplus while guaranteeing a desired profit level
for the producers, the vaccine market should organize low- and lower-middle-income countries into more
non-cooperating entities, and high- and upper-middle-income countries in fewer coordinating entities. In
practical terms, this also implies that entities with LIC and LMIC countries group them in a higher number
of market segments procuring sequentially in order of descending GNI per capita. Currently in the global
vaccine market, low-income countries pool-procure through few coordinating entities (e.g., UNICEF, and
PAHO), under a single-market segment, while higher-income countries negotiate independently, and have
different price levels. Gavi’s and PAHO’s efforts to innovate market dynamics have incentivized pooled procurement for LIC and LMIC through large single-price markets, which are equivalent to procuring through
few large coordinating entities with a single-price policy per vaccine dose. Our study suggest that if the market is not fully cooperative, having a higher number of price levels by coordinating entity offers more saving
opportunities, especially when low-income countries buy vaccines after higher-income countries (UMIC
and HIC). Ordering the negotiation by decreasing GNI may lead to lower coverage if there is limited supply
of vaccines. Under such conditions following and ascending negotiating order can still generate customer
surplus for low-income countries while securing additional access to vaccines. Maintaining a high level of
market segmentation could induce most countries to pay close – but still bellow – their reservation price.
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This study shares insights from an academic experiment that assumes that all procuring entities aim to buy
vaccines affordably and ensure that producers obtain the desired return on their sales. Under this hypothetically altruistic buying, there are opportunities to enhance affordability by controlling when countries buy
vaccines and how the pool procurement structure is organized. Implementing the proposed mathematicallybased vaccine procurement mechanism will require that all coordinating entities have access to a system
that allows them to determine optimal procurement plans. However, most importantly for implementing the
proposed market dynamics, the supply of vaccines must be sufficient to cover the antigen demand. Whereas
the current procurement already has incentives to follow the optimal procuring order, changes in supply
availability might make it beneficial to design incentives to follow a procuring order based on ascending
income per capita. However, designing such incentives is beyond the scope of this study.
The purpose of our modeling effort is to understand if there are better ways of procuring and deploying
vaccines than the status quo in a non-cooperative market with price discounts by volume. We rely on
an optimization-based approach to generate insights for synchronizing a global vaccine market. We do not
expect that all existing coordinating entities would embrace a mathematically-based procurement. However,
we believe that our recommendations can provoke a reconsideration of whether entities such as Gavi and
PAHO should continue having single-price levels. It is not sustainable to sacrifice manufacturing profits to
enhance affordability, as that might reduce the availability of the supply. This study suggests that extending
pooled procurement to UMIC and HICs can offer a revenue cushion to mitigate global profit losses when
the global pediatric vaccine market is synchronized to offer more affordability to LICs.

Appendix A: Other Figures
All figures generating during the study have been uploaded to the GitHub repository at
https://github.com/ba8641/ME_General.git.
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Chapter 3

Study 2: Exploring Market Segment
Assignment Strategies to Monopsonistic
Entities in a Hypothetically Coordinated
Vaccine Market
Abstract
This study presents a simulation-optimization approach for implementing the first stage of a four-stage optimization framework used to simulate a hypothetically coordinated vaccine market. The study’s overall
goal is to optimally make procurement decisions that result in more affordable vaccines for the buyers and
profitable for their producers. In the initial stage, groups of market segments are assigned to coordinating entities that will make optimal procurement decisions under tiered pricing and pool procurement mechanisms.
We explore nine different market-to-entity assignment policies through variants of a min-max optimization
problem that mimics assignment policies with varying levels of cooperation among market segments. Our
results show that market segments with low purchasing power can maximize their savings if they procure
together with market segments with higher purchasing power. Additionally, market assignments that result
in coordinating entities serving similar size populations mitigate the profit reduction of transferring savings
to low-income market segments.
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3.1

Introduction

This study presents a simulation-optimization process to enhance global pediatric vaccine affordability via
a market-agent design. International organizations recognize vaccines as a cost-effective healthcare intervention with savings that can be 16 times higher than the costs of treating preventable illnesses [55, 56].
However, 19.5 million children worldwide still do not have access to routine immunizations [8]. We hypothesize that pediatric vaccine access is partially affected by the lack of coordination in the global vaccine
market among buyers and the asymmetric power relationship between buyers and large vaccine producers [18, 51, 57]. Currently, countries can procure vaccines on their own or through pooled procurement
mechanisms. Examples of such pooling include the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) Revolving Fund, or low-income countries that buy vaccines at UNICEF’s prices with Gavi’s financial support [9].
In this study, pooled procurement agents are referred to as "coordinating entities" who make procurement
decisions to benefit the buyers and the vaccine producers.
This paper complements a preliminary study where we determined that cooperation among coordinating entities increases both affordability and profits for the global vaccine market [57]. However, more coordinating
entities and market segmentation in the global market increase aggregate affordability of target low-income
countries at the expense of profits for vaccine producers. The previous study simulates the global vaccine
market as a system in which multiple coordinating entities sequentially make optimal procurement decisions for groups of countries without cooperating with other entities. The countries of each entity are also
divided into different market segments based on their GNI per capita. Optimal decisions are determined via
a three-stage optimization process iteratively applied to each entity. "Stage 1" maximizes total social surplus
(total welfare) by determining which vaccines each of the defined coordinating entities buys and in which
quantities. "Stage 2" and "Stage 3" use the resulting procuring quantities to determine a range of prices per
vaccine that maintains the optimal total social surplus of "Stage 1" [18]. Countries in the vaccine market
were organized into market segments for pricing purposes in a tiered pricing scheme [58]. Alves-Maciel
and Proano [57] studied the effect of procurement cooperation in the vaccine market (i.e., the number of independent coordinating entities) on savings and profits. For assigning market segments to each coordinating
entity, market segments were ranked based on the average GNI per capita of their countries, then greedily
assigned to coordinating entities so that each entity has the same number of market segments.
In this study, we evaluate the effect on affordability and profits of using nine proposed policies on assigning
market segments to coordinating entities on the same simulated global vaccine market. We use streams of
randomized data as inputs for our optimization-simulation process to determine the optimal assignment of
market segments into coordinating entities and then feed those entities into the same three-stage approach of
Alves-Maciel and Proano [57] to determine savings and profits at the market segment level. The proposed
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Table 3.1: Simulated sorting criteria for determining which market segments are assigned to each coordinating entity.
Scenario ID Scenario
Description of the criteria associated with the simulated scenario
Name
O1

Benchmark

Markets are ranked by the average GNI of their countries and are greedily
assigned to the entities, so that each entity coordinates an equal number
of markets

O2

Equalize
RP

Markets are assigned to entities so that the potential dollar value per dose
coordinated by each entity is as close as possible to that of each of the
other entities

O3

Equalize
Population

Markets are assigned to entities so that the number of children cared for
by a given entity is as close as possible to the number in any other entity.

O4

Strong
LICs

Markets are assigned to entities so that the potential dollar value per dose
of the markets coordinated by entities with at least one low-income country (LIC) is as high as possible.

O5

Big LICs

Markets are assigned to entities so that the aggregated children population
for entities with at least one LIC is as high as possible.

O6

Isolated
HICs

Markets are assigned to entities so that the dollar value per dose of the
markets coordinated by entities with at least one LIC is as high as possible, without including any high-income countries (HICs) in that same
entity.

O7

Closed
HICs

Markets are assigned to entities so that the children population under entities with at least one LIC market is as high as possible without including
the population of markets with HICs in that same entity.

O8

Strong
HICs

Markets are assigned to entities so that the potential dollar value of the
markets coordinated by entities with at least one HIC is as high as possible.

O9

Big HICs

Markets are assigned to entities so that children population for entities
with at least one HIC is as high as possible.

strategy is equivalent to adding a preliminary optimization stage, "Stage 0", for assigning market segments
to coordinating entities, to the three-stage approached tested in our previous study. A general max-min
optimization approach is used to generate eight different optimization problem representations for "Stage
0", depending on the market assignment policy being simulated. Table 3.1 describes the policy selected
for comparison. It should be stressed that during the simulation, each coordinating entity goes through all
four stages before the next coordinating entity starts its negotiation. We assume that coordinating entities
representing market segments with higher GNI per capita negotiate first (i.e., the sum of the GNI per capita
of the market segments assigned to each coordinating entity determines the negotiation order).

EXPLORING MARKET SEGMENT ASSIGNMENT STRATEGIES TO
CHAPTER 3. MONOPSONISTIC ENTITIES IN A HYPOTHETICALLY COORDINATED

40

VACCINE MARKET

Section 3.2 briefly explores the existing literature of assignment problems for group buying both in the
context of simulation or pure optimization. Section 3.3 explains the simulation process, including mathematical modeling used in the distribution of market segments to coordinating entities and the metrics of
interest collected at each iteration of the simulation. Section 3.4 summarizes experimental results and their
implications. Section 3.5 offers concluding remarks.

3.2

Literature Review

The literature on assignment problems is extensive [59, 60, 61]. However, the literature that links assignment problems with group-buying in a simulated market is still limited. Bertsimas et al. [62] explores how
fairness in the coordinated allocation of resources among multiple stakeholders, with their own utility functions, compares to an allocation with an optimal social surplus. The paper maximizes the minimum utility of
resource allocation for each stakeholder while still guaranteeing a certain level of overall utility. The study
proposes that the solution with the highest overall utility might not be the fairest. For our case, this implies
that allocating market segments to coordinating entities should consider the overall system performance and
the impact on the different market segments and the producers. Salles and Barria [63] upholds this assertion.
However, contrast is offered by Şen and Çınar [64], who offers a way to explore a range of performances,
rather than considering optimizing fairness as maximizing the minimum utility among stakeholders. However, Şen and Çınar [64] also incorporates allocation criteria into the process by incorporating weights in
a prior stage to the max-min solution, which then determines the actual allocation. This approach shows a
single objective function formulation generating a value that can be used regardless of the chosen criteria,
which only affect the value of parameters.
Specific to simulation, there is a rich coalition-forming literature that can focus both on buyers or sellers.
A common assumption is that there exists a leader forming the coalition, for whom utility is maximized
[65, 66, 67, 68]. This assumption does not apply when the leader forming the coalition is an independent
organization outside of buyers or sellers and tries to maximize total social surplus (i.e., a coordinating
entity). This gap in the literature widens when the independent entity explores different criteria in forming
such coalitions in a group-buying procedure. Simulation studies on coalition forming in the global vaccine
market are currently non-existent. This creates both methodological and application opportunities for this
study.
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3.3
3.3.1

Methodology
Simulation Overview

At the start of the simulation process, we decide on a sorting policy from Table 3.1 so that "Stage 0" can
assign market segments to coordinating entities. This means that there are nine scenarios to be simulated.
For each scenario, we generate 50 instances of data randomizing the reservation prices between 90% and
110% of their base values (i.e., the maximum prices each market segment is willing to pay for a dose of
each available vaccine is different for each instance). Thus, the total amount spent in each instance of the
simulated negotiation (i.e., the market value) is different.
Our fixed experimental setup consists of: (1) 194 countries grouped into 12 market segments based on
their income per capita; (2) 4 non-cooperating coordinating entities procuring vaccines sequentially; (3)
14 vaccine producers offering; and (4) 52 vaccine products. By calculating the average GNI per capita of
the countries in the 12 market segments and applying the classification used by Bank" [2], markets 1 to
3 are considered high-income, 4-6 are considered upper-middle-income, 7-9 are considered lower-middleincome, and 10-12 are considered low-income. The baseline reservation prices for each vaccine in a market
were estimated based on the procedure proposed by Mosquera [51]. The sequence in which coordinating
entities negotiate depends on the sum of the GNI per capita of its assigned market segments. The one with
the highest sum of GNI per capita negotiates first, whereas the one with the lowest GNI per capita negotiates
last [57, 60].
The simulation process flows as shown in Algorithm 2. Figure 3.1 illustrates the same simulation process
graphically. The formulation of "Stages 1, 2, and 3" are omitted from this manuscript but can be found in
Alves-Maciel and Proano [57].

The simulation process flows thusly: (1) 50 instances of data are generated; (2) One of the scenarios shown in
Table 3.1 is chosen for comparison; (3) "Stage 0" is solved for one of the randomized instances; (4) the first
coordinating entity resulting from solving "Stage 0" is then used as input to solve "Stage 1", determining
which vaccines should be produced, and how much of each should be bought by each market segment
represented by that coordinating entity; (5) We solve "Stages 2 and 3" for the same coordinating entity to
determine the range of prices that maximize surplus for the procurement quantities resulting from "Stage
1"; (6) For coordinating entities 2 to 4, repeat steps 4 and 5; (7) Calculate performance metrics for the data
instance being used; (8) For randomized data instances 2 to 49, repeat steps 3 to 7; (9) Repeat steps 2 to 8
for the remaining scenarios; (10) compare overall results in each scenario. The formulation of "Stages 1,
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Figure 3.1: Illustrative diagram of the methodology adopted to compare the effect of each assignment
criteria (i.e., "Model"). Note that the four stages of the process are solved for each criteria using the same
dataset before proceeding to the next data instance and again solving the four stages of the process.
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2, and 3" are omitted from this manuscript due to space constraints but can be found in Alves-Maciel and
Proano [57].
Algorithm 2 Simulation Flow
1: Generate instances of data randomizing Rbm between 90%-110% of base value ∀b ∈ B, m ∈ M .
2: for s ∈ Scenario list do
3:
for n ∈ Set of instances do
4:
Solve "Stage 0" to define the assignment of market segments to coordinating entities.
5:
for e ∈ Coordinated entities, ordered by sum of the market GNIs do
6:
Solve Stage 1 for coordinating entity e, defining Xbm and gb ∀b ∈ B, m ∈ M .
7:
Using Xbm and gb ∀b ∈ B, m ∈ M , solve Stage 2 for coordinating entity e.
8:
Using Xbm and gb ∀b ∈ B, m ∈ M , solve Stage 3 for coordinating entity e.
9:
Calculate performance metrics for instance n.
10:
Compute descriptive statistics for scenario s.
11: Compare results across all scenarios.
The performance of the simulated instances for each of the problem representations for "Stage 0" is summarized via the metrics described in Table 3.2 using the notation introduced in Section 3.3.2. These metrics
are expressed relative to the total dollar value of the vaccine market.
Table 3.2: Metrics used to compare the proposed scenarios.
Description
Expression

Metric
Customer Surplus (CS)

Difference between reservation prices for a dose
of vaccine and the lower bound of prices defined
in "Stage 2".

(Rbm − Ybm ) Xbm

Revenue (P )

Upper bound of prices defined in "Stage 3" times
the number of doses bought.

Xbm Ybm

Market
(M V )

Total monetary value in the vaccine market. Sum
of all customer savings and all profit across all
market segments and coordinating entities, for all
vaccines. Costs of vaccines being produced are
subtracted from the revenue to represent profits.

P P P

Value

CS + (P − Cb gb )

e∈E b∈B m∈M


Total
Social
Surplus (T SS)

An aggregate indicator of the savings obtained by
all countries relative to the prices they were willing to pay and the profits obtained by all vaccine
producers.


P P

m∈M b∈B

Rbm Xbm − Cb gb
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3.3.2

Notation

The formulation for "Stage 0" is represented as a family of max-min problems whose constraints change
depending on the problem criteria listed in Table 3.1, except for the benchmark O1. To describe these
problem formulations, we rely on the following notation:

Sets:
B: set of vaccines
M : set of market segments
E: set of coordinating entities, ordered based on descending average GNI per capita of the represented
market segments
Parameters:
Rbm : Reservation price of vaccine b ∈ B for countries in market segment m ∈ M (i.e., maximum price per
dose that market m ∈ M is willing to pay for vaccine b ∈ B)
lm : Average birth cohort per year of countries in market m ∈ M
Cb : Annualized R&D and production fixed cost necessary to produce vaccine b ∈ B, considering a desired
rate of return
gnim : Average gross national income (GNI) per capita among countries in market m ∈ M
GL : Income threshold per capita under which countries in a market segment are considered low-income
countries
GH : Income threshold per per capita above which countries are considered high-income countries
F : Large constant
Variables:
K: lower bound used in the characterization of the max-min criteria described in Table 3.1. The values
and units taken by this variable are a function of integrating the constraints (3.5) to (3.10) to characterize the different "Stage 0" assignment problems.
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Zem : Binary variable taking a value of 1 if market m ∈ M is assigned to entity e ∈ E, or 0 otherwise
Xbm : Number of vaccine doses of vaccine b ∈ B to be purchased by country m ∈ M . Decision variable for
"Stage 1"
gb : Binary variable indicating whether b ∈ B is being produced or not. Decision variable for "Stage 1"
Ybm : Price paid for vaccine b ∈ B in country m ∈ M . Decision variable for "Stage 2" and "Stage 3"
se : Auxiliary binary variable indicating whether entity e ∈ E serves at least one low-income market
segment for problems O4, O5, O6 and O7, or high-income for problems O8 and O9.

3.3.3

Stage 0

The objective (3.1) and constraints (3.2), (3.3), and (3.4) are common to all "Stage 0" problem representations.The remaining constraints will be added to the model depending on the assignment policy. The
objective function (3.1) maximizes the lower bound K. Restriction (3.2) guarantees that at least a country is
assigned to each entity. Restriction (3.3) enforces that each market segment is assigned to exactly one entity.
Restriction (3.4) ensures that coordinating entities maintain a negotiation order based on a decreasing GNI
per capita.
To represent problem O2, inequality (3.5) is added to the core model (expressions (3.1) to (3.4)). The added
constraint makes K the lower bound on the highest total prices per dose that market segments assigned to
any entity are willing to pay. Similarly, problem O3 is characterized by adding restriction (3.6) to the core
model ((3.1) to (3.4)). The added constraint makes K the lower bond of the population served by any entity.
To represent problem O4, (3.7), (3.11) and (3.12) are added to the core model making K represents the lower
bound on the highest total reservation prices of entities that coordinate at least one low-income market.
To characterize problem O5, (3.8), (3.11) and (3.12) are added to the core model to make K the lower
bound on the population served by the coordinating entities that support at least one market with low-income
countries.
For characterizing problem O6, we integrate constraints (3.9), (3.11) and (3.12) to the core model to make K
the lower bound on the total reservation prices of the entities with at least one market with low-income countries, excluding entities with high-income markets. Problem O7 is similar but considering the population,
and requires (3.10), (3.11) and (3.12) to be used in conjunction with the core model.
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Problems O8 and O9 require, respectively, (3.7), (3.13) and (3.14), and (3.8), (3.13) and (3.14) to be used
together with the core model. They function as O4 and O5, but for high-income countries.
Restrictions (3.11) and (3.12) force the binary variable se to be 0 if no low-income countries are assigned to
a coordinating entity e. Restrictions (3.13) and (3.14) force the binary variable se to be 0 if no high-income
markets are assigned to the coordinating entity e.

max K
K
X
s.t.
Zem ≥ 1

(3.1)
∀ e∈E

(3.2)

∀ m∈M

(3.3)

∀ e ∈ 2..||E||

(3.4)

∀ e∈E

(3.5)

∀ e∈E

(3.6)

∀ e∈E

(3.7)

∀ e∈E

(3.8)

Zem Rbm  + (1 − se )F ∀ e ∈ E

(3.9)

m∈M

X

Zem = 1

e∈E

X X

Zem gnim ≤

m∈M b∈B

K≤

X X

gnim Z(e−1)m

m∈M b∈B

X X

Zem Rbm

m∈M b∈B

K≤

X

Zem lm

m∈M

!
X X

K ≤ se

Zem Rbm

+ (1 − se )F

m∈M b∈B

!
X

K ≤ se

Zem lm

+ (1 − se )F

X

X

m∈M





K ≤ se 

m∈M :gnim ≤GH b∈B




X

K ≤ se 

Zem lm  + (1 − se )F

∀e∈E

(3.10)

∀e∈E

(3.11)

∀e∈E

(3.12)

∀e∈E

(3.13)
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m∈M :gnim ≤GL

X

0≥
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0≥

X
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3.4

Results

3.4.1

Outputs

The simulation generates visible patterns in the resulting assignments for specific criteria, as shown in Figure
3.2. O3 groups all low-income markets with the high-income markets in Entity 1 (the one that negotiates
first). When high-income markets are excluded in O5 and O6, all market segments except high-income ones
are joined together in a coordinating entity. However, the sum of the prices that those market segments
are willing to pay is still smaller than that of individual high-income market segments, justifying why they
negotiate first. As the same distribution is observed in O5 and O6, the results of O5 have been omitted from
subsequent figures.

Figure 3.2: Assignment of market segments (columns) into coordinating entities (colors) depending on the
criteria used (lines).
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Figure 3.3 shows

T SS T CS
MV , MV

and

TPF
MV

(i.e.,

P P

T P − Cb gb ) with an overall view of the system. Figure

m∈M b∈B

3.4 shows the same for low-income market segments (i.e., markets 10, 11, 12), as the focus of our research
is on this group. Figure 3.5 shows the aggregate customer surplus and revenue for market segments 4, 5,
6 (those classified as upper-middle-income in the World Bank classification), since the results are the most
relevant for our analysis. Results specific for high-income and lower-middle-income market segments were
omitted, but are provided in the repository referenced in Appendix 3.6. The solid lines in Figures 3.3 to 3.4
show the performance for benchmark market-to-entity assignment.
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Figure 3.3: Comparison between

T SS T CS
MV , MV ,

and

TPF
MV

across different criteria.
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Figure 3.4: Comparison of customer surplus and revenue across different criteria for low-income market
segments (LIC).

Figure 3.5: Comparison of customer surplus and revenue across different criteria for upper-middle-income
market segments (UMIC).
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3.4.2

Discussion

As shown in Figure 3.3, all proposed criteria perform better than the benchmark scenario in terms of overall
total social surplus but worse in customer surplus. However, Figure 3.4 shows that the overall savings
specific to low-income countries also improve in all considered scenarios. However, when looking at the
overall customer surplus in Figure 3.3, we see a decrease in performance instead. The decrease in overall
customer surplus derives mainly from upper-middle-income countries, as seen in Figure 3.5. The same
figures also show that sales to low-income countries are also responsible for the increase in profitability. As
the improvement in profit for vaccine producers is greater than the decrease in savings, the resulting surplus
is positive, as shown in Figure 3.3.

3.5

Conclusion

The trends seen in section 3.4 suggest that low-income countries benefit from negotiating in conjunction
with higher-income countries. Savings for low-income countries are improved, while upper-middle-income
countries worsen. This arrangement is also beneficial to vaccine producers. This means that any of the
proposed criteria can be used to mitigate the diminished profits seen in previous experiments when not all
entities in the vaccine market cooperate. Those results also suggest that coordinating entities such as Gavi
limiting their services to low-income countries might induce further savings to target low-income markets
if some higher-income countries were included in their pool procurement efforts. The increase in profits
might be an incentive for producers to join the coordinated market. The additional access of supply can
result in lower-price per dose for UMIC and HIC than if these markets procure on their own. Even if highincome countries cannot be convinced to participate, scenarios O6 and O7 show that affordability and profits
can still improve as long as upper-middle-income countries cooperate. To minimize the impact on uppermiddle-income countries, criteria O3 (equalizing the population across different coordinating entities) can
be implemented to offer improvements to low-income countries and vaccine producers.
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3.6

Appendices

Additional figures and the generated data can be found in the repository https://github.com/
ba8641/WinterSimulation2021.git.

The manuscript for the unpublished Alves-Maciel and

Proano [57] can be found there as well.

Author Biographies
BRUNO ALVES-MACIEL is a Ph.D. candidate in the Kate Gleason College of Engineering of the Rochester Institute of
Technology, where he has studied since graduating in Industrial Engineering at the University of Sao Paulo. He has focused his
research on global healthcare, developing optimization and simulation techniques to address global welfare for routine vaccine
immunizations. Other interests include machine learning-supported optimization, logistics, and data analytics. He is expected to
finish his thesis by Summer 2021. His e-mail address is ba8641@rit.edu.

Dr. RUBEN A. PROANO is an associate professor at the Industrial & Systems Engineering department at the Rochester Institute
of Technology. He earned his Ph.D. in Industrial Engineering at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. His research
focuses on the application of Operations Research to the solution of health problems. His e-mail address is rpmeie@rit.edu

Chapter 4

Study 3: Buying Vaccines Through a Single
Payment as a Proxy for Procuring Vaccines
via Formularies
In this study we evaluate the possibility of making vaccines more affordable without impacting profits by
exploring the effects of selling vaccines as formularies, or baskets of vaccines bundled in the same sale.
Assuming that countries are grouped into market segments for tiered pricing purposes, and are coordinated
by a single decision maker, we propose selling vaccines as formularies by changing their pricing scheme so
that buyers make a single lump-sum payment to each vaccine producer for their vaccines. Results show that
changing the pricing scheme can improve affordability.

4.1

Introduction

Immunization is a global health intervention cost-effective in saving lives [4, 5, 6]. Vaccines can be acquired
through direct procurement, pooled procurement, or third-party procurement [3]. For low-income (LIC)
and low-middle-income countries (LMIC), regardless of the procurement mechanism, most of the vaccine
volume is bought through tendering processes for each separate vaccine [69, 70, 71]. Each tendering cycle in
the global vaccine market can occur up to 24 months prior to the effective delivery of doses to the buyer [8].
As a result countries may manage multiple purchase processes concurrently. Those tenders have been shown
to negatively impact supply continuity by pushing producers out of markets, and diminish the incentive to
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invest in innovative Research and Development (R&D) [72]. Access is also an issue, as in 2018, 19.4
million infants had no access to basic vaccines [9], a situation exacerbated in low-income countries [73]. In
this study we explore the possibility of having a single tender combining different vaccine products to cover
multiple antigens, rather than having separate tenders per antigen.
The proposed scenario considers pooled procurement between all buyers assuming that purchases are organized by a coordinating entity that defines quantities and prices in a hypothetically coordinated vaccine
market (HCVM) [18]. We also rely on tiered pricing, common in the vaccine market [13], to group countries
into market segments for pricing purposes. All countries belonging to a market segment pay the same price
for a dose of a given vaccine, yet those prices change across markets segments based on their countries’
average gross national income per capita (GNI). For this study, the vaccine products are offered through
formularies, or baskets of of multiple vaccines sold together through the same tender.
Rather than defining a price per dose, the coordinating entity can define the amount each market segment
pays for the entire vaccine formulary. We seek to determine procurement plans based on formularies that
are as affordable as possible and yet profitable for the producers. The results deriving from this formulary
procurement are then compared to the regular single-antigen-procurement approach studied in Proano et al.
[18], Mosquera [51] and with the Group Vaccine Allocation (GVA) model from Alves-Maciel and Proano
[57].
The hypothesized benefits of formulary procurement include securing economies of scale by pricing vaccines based on a higher volume of sales, the ability to more easily meet a desired return for a portfolio of
products, the reduction of setup negotiation costs, and potentially increasing market share [74]. For the
countries buying vaccines in the global market, this arrangement can also save on transaction and logistics
costs. We assume that vaccines are necessity goods with inelastic annual demand that must be met for all
participating countries in the global market [75, 76, 77]. We also assume that there is enough cold-chain
capacity, and inventory costs are not cosidered when vaccines are bought.
This study aims to answer the following question:
Q: Under which conditions buying vaccines as formularies leads to more affordability or profits than
when they are procured individually?
We propose a lump-sum approach to answer this question via a formulation that allows coordinating entities
to calculate lump-sum payments between market segments and producers. The methodology relies on a
three-stage optimization process that first defines which vaccines should be produced and how much is
purchased by each market segment through a Mixed-Integer Programming problem, while the second and
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third stages use those vaccine quantities as inputs in Linear Programs that determine bundle price ranges
that would be acceptable for countries and producers via a single payment.
Section 4.2 examines not only the current literature on vaccine pricing, but also how other fields deal with
the problem of bundling products. Section 4.3 details the methods adopted in this study’s framework, the
mathematical models, and metrics used to evaluate our experimental scenarios. Results are presented in
Section 4.4, which also describes the input data for the experimental scenarios. Section 4.5 offers insights
from our results and opportunities for future work.

4.2

Literature Review

Throughout this literature review, we explore bundle pricing [74, 78, 79], necessity goods [75, 76], and
vaccine scheduling [18, 26, 44, 51, 80]. Pricing literature offers little insights into pricing products with
inelastic demand spread between a limited amount of complementary and substitute options (e.g., the demand for measles antigen to immunize children of a certain age has to be met through a limited number of
vaccines that offer that antigen either in isolation or in combination with other antigens, overlapping with
the inelastic demand for those other products). When looking at bundling in the vaccine market, most of
the research focuses on how to package multiple antigens into combination vaccines, rather than on creating
economically attractive baskets of vaccines (formularies) that can be adopted by different market segments.
The distinction is relevant because a common assertion in bundle pricing is that the price of the bundle is
lower than the price of the sum of its separate components [78, 81], while combination vaccines are usually
more expensive than the individual vaccines that can be used to obtain the same level of immunization [82].
The literature on bundle pricing considers different perspectives, often in a market with a small number
of suppliers. Ma and Xie [78] compares optimality and system stability in bundle pricing, but ignores
the perspective of buyers, considering a single seller as the principal decision-maker. The customer is
assumed to freely accept or decline the purchase of two different products, or the bundle that combine both,
with neither of the two products offered being a necessity good. Similarly, Bakos and Brynjolfsson [74]
considers the perspective of producers to increase profits by bundling information goods. The paper suggest
that offering a menu of bundles for each market segment leads to better pricing, and can benefit producers
by reducing costs or increasing market share.
Armstrong and Vickers [79] discusses how offering bundled prices lower than the sum of the price of its
components can increase welfare in a system. Similar to our case, customers are assumed to always participate in the market (i.e., purchase products), where a symmetric duopolists offers two products. The
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authors claim that non-linear pricing (i.e., bundles sold at lower prices than the sum of its constituents, and
economies of scale) leads to a more efficient scenario than when such discounts are not offered.
Necessity goods are items that have inelastic demand and will be required regardless of differences in income
levels. Several studies have focused on whether healthcare services can be considered necessity goods
[75, 76, 77]. In our study, we consider vaccines as necessity goods with demand that has to be entirely met
for all market segments.
To the best of our knowledge, the literature on vaccine scheduling has not focused onto formulary purchases.
Abrahams and Ragsdale [80] discusses packages of multi-dose vaccines that can be considered multi-dose
baskets for one type of vaccine. The paper compares two methods of vaccine scheduling for patients in
traveling clinics, with immediate application for decision-makers. The scope of the problem is limited to
scheduling for patients in a single facility, not focusing on the global vaccine market.
Regarding general vaccine pricing, some works propose methods to generate a vaccine procurement plan
by considering individual prices per doses per vaccine, rather than offering prices per bundles of vaccines.
Proano et al [18] proposed a multi-stage optimization problem to address a hypothetically coordinated vaccine market with multiple buyers and producers coordinated by a single agent. First it determines which
vaccines to produce and in which quantity, while the two subsequent stages define boundaries for price negotiation [18]. Mosquera [51] extends Proano et al. [18] to conclude that having more price segmentation
improves savings for low-income countries while decreasing the profits of vaccine producers. A linear relationship between vaccine pricing and income is proposed to estimate reservation prices for countries where
data is not available. Similarly to Proano et al. [18], Behzad et al. [26] proposes a methodology to define
vaccination plans for a single buyer and period. Behzad et al. [26] explores reasons why a buyer might
choose a plan that does not necessarily offer the lowest costs.

4.3

Methodology

In this study, the agents considered in the vaccine market are countries, producers, and a coordinating entity.
Countries are grouped into market segments for pricing purposes. Each market segment’s income per capita
is the mean income per capita of the countries belonging to the market segment, and the population is the sum
of the countries’ populations. We assume that the maximum prices the markets are willing to pay for each
vaccine dose are proportional to the average income per capita of each market segment (i.e., reservation
prices) [51]. A single coordinating entity negotiates the procurement of those market segments to cover
the antigen needs of the populations. Producers can decide whether or not to manufacture any vaccine in
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their portfolio, each of them with limited production capacity and an associated fixed cost that includes the
minimum acceptable profit margin, as well as annualized R&D costs. The procurement exercise aims to
clear antigen demand for a year, and hence production costs are annualized.
The proposed lump-sum approach allows each market segment to make a single lump-sum payment to each
producer, rather than defining prices per dose of each vaccine in different purchases. This approach and its
formulation will be referred as Lump-sum Grouping (LuG), described in detail in Section 4.3.1. We propose
a three-state optimization-based process similar to the one in Proano et al. [18]. The first stage determines
which vaccines must be produced, and how much of them will be purchased by each market segment. This
goal is achieved by a Mixed-Integer-Programming (MIP) formulation maximizing total social surplus (i.e.,
the sum between savings for the market segments, and profits for the producers). The second stage uses the
quantities calculated during the first stage as inputs to a linear programming formulation that determines
the most affordable prices (LP) that still generates profits for the producers (i.e., we maximize savings for
market segments). The third stage again uses the quantities calculated in the first stage as inputs into a linear
programming formulation that determines the most profitable prices (HP) the market segments are still able
to pay (i.e., we maximize profits for producers) to acquire vaccines. Results in Section 4.4 are interpreted
based on the mid-price between HP and LP prices.

4.3.1

LuG: Lump-Sum Grouping Problem

Given a set of market segments coordinated by a single entity, the LuG problem can be solved through a
multi-stage optimization process, as shown in Algorithm 3. First, a mixed integer programming model determines which vaccines should be manufactured, and how much of them is bought by each market segment.
Effectively, a formulary for a market consists of all vaccines purchased from a producer for the market in
a year period. The second model is a linear programming formulation that determines the most affordable
price for the formulary defined in the first model. Similarly, the third model is also a linear programming
model that determines the most profitable prices for the formulary defined in the first model. Even at the
most affordable prices the proposed model guarantees profits for all producers who are manufacturing vaccines, while the most profitable prices should not exceed the prices at which countries would have obtained
the same vaccines separately. The flow of the solution process is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
The description of the LuG formulation is provided after introducing the following notation:
Sets:
B: set of vaccines
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Figure 4.1: Illustrative diagram of the methodology adopted to compare the effect of each pricing policy.
For each instance of data, we solve a 3 stage optimization process. In the benchmark, the pricing is given by
a price per dose, whereas the proposed model has a lump-sum price for all vaccines. The metrics can then
be contrasted between the pricing policies.
Algorithm 3 Solution Procedure of LuG
1: Collect data on vaccines and market segments of interest
2: Solve the first stage of the LuG model to define which vaccines to produce and quantities sold to each
market segment
3: Define upper and lower price each market segment pays to each producer when incorporating problem
constraints through the second and third optimization stages
4: Calculate equivalent range of individual prices per dose for the same selection of vaccines
5: Generate output metrics
6: Compare metrics deriving from lump-sum prices to metrics deriving from individual prices per dose

A: set of antigens offered by immunization
M : set of market segments in which countries are grouped
P : set of vaccine producers
Ba1 : set of vaccines offering antigen a ∈ A alone or in combination with other antigens
Bp2 : set of vaccines manufactured by a producer p ∈ P
Parameters:
Rbm : Reservation price of vaccine b ∈ B in market segment m ∈ M . Maximum price per dose that market
m ∈ M is willing to pay for vaccine b ∈ B.
lm : Average birth cohort per year in market m ∈ M
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Cb : Annualized R&D and production fixed cost necessary to produce vaccine b ∈ B, considering a desired
rate of return
dam : Antigen demand for a ∈ A per child in a year to fully immunize a child in market segment m ∈ M
according to the immunization schedule in the market
Sb : Total supply of vaccine b ∈ B per year
α: Scaling factor that allows vaccine prices to increase when quantity smaller than the total capacity of a
vaccine is purchased among all market segments
ub : Minimum price paid by any market for a dose of vaccine b ∈ B
Variables:
Xbm : Quantity of vaccine b ∈ B to be purchased by market segment m ∈ M
Omp : Lump-sum price market segment m ∈ M pays to producer p ∈ P
gb : Binary variable indicating whether b ∈ B is being produced (i.e., gb = 1) or not (i.e., gb = 0)
Note that variable costs for vaccine production are not directly included in the model, as their magnitude is
negligible compared to the fixed costs. Therefore, we assume that meeting the desired return on investment
Cb includes covering the variable costs of producing up to Sb doses of vaccine b ∈ B. The problem
formulation for each stage is shown below. Stages 2 and 3 have the same constraints, so those were omitted
in the description of Stage 3 to avoid needless repetition.
Stage 1:

Max
X,g

s.t.

X X

Rbm Xbm −

m∈M b∈B

X

X

Cb g b

(4.1)

b∈B

Xbm = dam lm

∀ a ∈ A, m ∈ M

(4.2)

Xbm ≤ Sb gb

∀ b∈B

(4.3)

Xbm ≥ 0

∀ b ∈ B, m ∈ M

(4.4)

gb = {0, 1}

∀b∈B

(4.5)

b∈Ba1

X
m∈M
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Stage 2:


Max
O

s.t.

X


X


m∈M

X

Rbm Xbm −

Omp ≥

p∈P

X

X
b∈Bp2

Omp ≤

Omp 

(4.6)

p∈P

b∈B

m∈M

X

X

X

Cb gb Sb −
Sb

!

X
α
bm
m∈M
+ gb ∀ p ∈ P
Sb

P

(4.7)

∀ m∈M

Rbm Xbm

(4.8)

b∈B

Omp ≥

m∈M

X X
m∈M

∀ p∈P :

Xbm ub

b∈Bp2

X

gb > 0

(4.9)

b∈B2p

Omp ≤ 0

∀ p∈P :

X

gb = 0

(4.10)

b∈Bp2

Omp ≥ 0

∀ p ∈ P, m ∈ M

(4.11)

Stage 3:

Max
O

X X

Omp −

m∈M p∈P

s.t. (4.7) − (4.11)

X

Cb gb

(4.12)

b∈B

(4.13)

Objective function (4.1) maximize the total social surplus (i.e., the sum of customer surplus and profits).
Restriction (4.2) guarantees that the demand for vaccines is met. Restriction (4.3) limits the purchasing
quantities to the supply available of each vaccine.
Objective function (4.6) maximizes the difference between the price market segments are willing to pay
and the lump-sum price effectively paid, determining the minimum feasible lump-sum prices, LP. Objective
function (4.12) maximizes the difference between the lump-sum price and the annuity costs of the vaccines
being produced, effectively determining the maximum feasible lump-sum prices, HP. Restriction (4.7) defines the linear elasticity for vaccine prices. Restriction (4.8) guarantees that the lump-sum payments by
a market to all producers do not exceed the aggregated reservation prices defined by the buyer. Restriction (4.9) guarantees that the lump-sum payments are higher than the minimum prices. Restriction (4.10)
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guarantees that unless a producer is selling at least one of the vaccines in its portfolio, it will receive no
payments.
Procuring vaccines by formularies does not require determining the purchasing price of individual vaccines.
From the producers’ point of view, as long as the revenue exceeds the fixed costs of producing vaccines,
there is no need to individualize the amounts being covered by different products. Similarly for the market
segments, as long as the overall amount paid is below the reservation prices of the same formulary if bought
separately, it is not necessary to distribute the prices per vaccine. This approach affords more flexibility
to distribute the purchasing costs. Not all market segments need to contribute equally to the revenue, and
there are situations where Omp = 0 is a possible solution. However, this does not necessarily mean that
those market segments are being subsidized by other markets, given the elasticity relationship expressed
in constraint (4.12). By adding its population to the demand, even without contributing revenue, a market
segment can lower the overall price being paid by all other segments.

4.3.2

Output Metrics

The metrics of interest in the LuG can be categorized in two: (1) global, and (2) market-level. In each of this
categories, we have measurements for the customers and for the producers. In the global category, metrics
are an aggregate across all participating market-segments. In the market-segment category, the metrics
are presented separately for each of the four traditional pricing market segments based on the World Bank
classification (low-income, lower-middle-income, upper-middle-income and high-income) [2]. Each market
from our experiment is classified depending on its income. The experiments are replicated by randomizing
reservation prices between 95% to 105% of their estimated baseline values. All metrics are normalized over
the global market value at a given replication (i.e., the sum of the dollar value of all potential purchases in
one particular replication) so that the randomization in the reservation prices does not affect the magnitude
of the results. In Section 4.4 we show figures for the mean-point price between the highest and lowest
purchasing prices, unless specified otherwise. Table 4.1 shows the metrics collected for each category.
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Name

Explanation

Market Value (M V )

The total monetary value in the vaccine market. Sum of

m∈M

all customer savings and all profit.
Customer Surplus (CS)
CS
MV

PF
MV

How much money is saved with negotiated prices com-

m∈C b∈B

customer surplus as a fraction of the market value.

CS
M
V
X

Rbm Xbm −

X

b∈B

X

l
Omp

pinP

Omp −

X

Cb gb

m∈M p∈P

b∈B

X X

(Xbm Rbm − Cb gb )

MV

Total social surplus across all entities as a fraction of the
market value

Cos

p∈P

X X

pared to the reservation prices.

Profit as a fraction of the market value.

T SS
MV

Formula
!
X
X h
X
CSm +
Omp −
Cb gb

Cosine similarity between the vector of vaccines g pro-

b∈B m∈M

MV
g LuG ·g Ben
||g LuG ||||g Ben ||

duced in the benchmark compared to the one produced
in the LuG model

Table 4.1: Variables used as performance metrics and their descriptions.

Through these metrics it is possible to gauge the affordability for the formularies created in each different
experimental scenario and also distinguish which market segments and countries benefit the most from each
arrangement. The same goes for vaccine producers, since we can see their overall profit as well as how
much each market segment contributes to the revenue.

4.4

Results

The dataset used for all scenarios contained 14 producers, 52 vaccines covering 6 antigens, and 194 countries
grouped into 4 market segments by proximity of income per capita. The datasets generated by randomizing
reservation prices are detailed in Appendix 4.6. Each dataset is used to solve a benchmark case scenario and
the lump-sum formulation for comparison. Figures 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 show the customer surplus, profit, and
total social surplus across all market segments for the LuG and the baseline scenarios. In the benchmark
case all vaccines can be bought individually via independent tenders. Figures comparing the dollar value
present similar trends, but were ommitted for brevity. They can be found at Appendix 4.6.
Figure 4.2 shows the aggregate customer surplus across all entities and market segments. Considering also
Figures 4.3 and 4.4, the general metrics

CS
MV

,

PF
MV

and

T SS
MV

show that the LuG is capable of generating

customer surplus worth 4% more of the total market value (or $1 billion without the normalization), and
thus suggest that countries should concentrate their payments to the same producer as a single lump-sum.
However, the benchmark generates outperforms the LuG in terms of profits by around 0.5% of the market value (or $200 million without normalizing by market value), which indicates that producers would
marginally benefit from offering individual vaccines. Figure 4.4 illustrates that the gain in savings surpasses
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CS
Figure 4.2: M
V across the different models. Overall, the lump-sum formulation generates the most customer surplus. There is a difference of around 4% between the benchmark and the lump-sum result.

PF
Figure 4.3: M
V performs best using the benchmark model. The lump-sum has results around 0.5% below
the results for the benchmark.

the diminishing of profits by around 1% (or $400 million without the normalization).
Figure 4.5 illustrate how the customer surplus behaves in low-income market segments when negotiating
with the average prices. The LuG generates higher customer surplus, which is critical, given that low-income
countries are target markets.
Figure 4.9 illustrates the revenue obtained from low-income market segments. The lower contribution from
low-income countries to the total revenue in the lump-sum model could suggest that market-segment would
become less of a priority to producers. However, this decrease is smaller than in other market segments,
suggesting that if the LuG model is adopted for negotiation, vaccine producers might be incentivized to
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is highest in the lump-sum model. The LuG model performs around 1% better than the

CS
Figure 4.5: The M
V in low-income countries shows a similar pattern to the aggregate metrics, with the
lump-sum formulation providing the most customer surplus at about 1% above the benchmark.

prioritize low-income countries in their production plans. The fall in revenue relative to the benchmark
observed in Figures 4.9, 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12 explains the decrease observed in Figure 4.3.

4.4.1

Analysis

The results of the LuG model show it to be less constrained than the benchmark, as it allows higher total
social surplus relative to market value. This is an expected result, as the LuG offers more flexibility than the
benchmark in allowing the surplus (both savings and revenue) of different vaccines to be distributed across
the total value.
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CS
Figure 4.6: Comparison between M
V for lower-middle-income countries shows a similar pattern to the lowincome metrics, with a difference of around 2% between LuG and benchmark.

CS
Figure 4.7: Comparison between M
V for upper-middle-income countries maintains a similar shape to lowermiddle-income countries metrics, also with a 1.5% difference between LuG and benchmark.

CS
Figure 4.8: Comparison between M
V for high-income countries is an inversion in relation to other figures.
The benchmark performs around 1.5% above the LuG.
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Figure 4.9: The MRV in low-income market segments shows that the benchmark has around 1% higher
revenue than the lump-sum model in low-income market segments.

Figure 4.10: The MRV in lower-middle-income countries shows that both models follow a similar pattern to
low-income revenue. The difference between LuG and benchmark expands to 2.5%.

Figure 4.11: In the MRV in upper-middle-income countries maintains the same shape as in lower-middle
income countries, with a similar difference of 1.5% between benchmark and LuG.
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Figure 4.12: The MRV in high-income countries maintains the same shape as in upper-middle income countries, with an approximate difference of 3% between benchmark and LuG.

Figure 4.13: The cosine similarity between the vector of produced vaccines between the LuG model and the
benchmark is close to 1, indicating high similarity between both.
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Results indicate opposite outcomes depending on whether the LuG or benchmark approach were followed.
This suggests that the vaccine market might behave similar to other domain industries, where mixing formularies with products being offered separately would offer better results [83]. However, the incremental
savings and social surplus is marginal and careful consideration needs to be placed on the effort needed to
implement such strategy. Coordinating entities stand to benefit the most from unifying their purchases as
lump-sums to each producer for all vaccines. The approach described in this study would alter the tender
system so that the contract goes not necessarily to the lowest bidder, but to the producer that can offer the
best set of annual formularies. For producers, the implication of a lump-sum model could possibly result in
lower set-up costs, less variability in demand, and increased market shares. In order to maintain high profits,
a hybrid model in which individual vaccines are offered to higher-income market segments could be used,
given that there is less volume purchased, less reliance on economies of scale, and more inelastic demand
[8, 9].

4.5

Conclusions

Section 4.4 shows a clear trade-off between the LuG and the benchmark depending on the stake-holder
being considered. For low-income countries, negotiating a lump-sum price is preferable than buying vaccines independently via individual tenders, the latter of which offers more profit to the producers. When
considering that other market segments have a greater relative decrease in revenue, this result suggests that
different market segments could utilize different negotiation strategies in order to improve affordability for
low-income countries while maintaining profits for the vaccine producers.
This study suggest to have tenders for different vaccines in the same negotiation, or change the negotiation
scheme so that one lump-sum payment is agreed upon each year. This negotiation would also allow buyers
to distribute savings better over all procured vaccines while still guaranteeing a return on investment for the
producers.
An extension for this study is to explore a hybrid problem where the LuG would be solved only for a subset
of market segments, while the benchmark sales scheme is solved for the remaining segments of the market.
We would expect that the market segments using the LuG would benefit with the most customer surplus,
while the market segments in the benchmark would still obtain positive savings, but would also generate
higher profit than when all negotiate through the LuG. Such market organization might be easier to achieve
than if all market segments changed their negotiation process, as no change would be made to the situation
of higher-income countries, while the producers would not have a decrease in revenue as abrupt as if all
market segments adopt the new negotiation model.
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Chapter 5

Study 4: How Does Dollar Value Affect the
Affordability and Profits of Global
Vaccines?
In this study we examine how prioritizing the needs of low-income countries in the global vaccine market
affect their savings, and how other market agents are impacted. We accomplish this analysis by positing the
existence of a hypothetical agent coordinating the market with procurement decisions that maximize the total
welfare (sum of savings and profits). The objective function representing the total welfare weights a dollar
in savings for low-income countries always higher than a dollar in savings from higher-income countries.
Through a numerical example considering routine childhood immunization, we find that it is possible to
increase the savings in low-income countries with little impact to higher-income countries by just changing
the choice of vaccines being produced.

5.1

Introduction

This paper proposes a multi-stage optimization process to improve the access to routine immunization vaccines for target LIC countries . The dynamics of the global vaccine market are sensitive to the income per
capita of the countries buying vaccines [2]. Literature shows that producers target their pediatric vaccines
to high-income market segments, since their high reservation prices allow producers to extract more profits
[33, 57, 84]. High-income market segments procure vaccines at prices lower than the maximum amount
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they would be willing to pay (i.e., their reservation prices), while, unfortunately, the same vaccines are unaffordable for lower income countries even at discounted prices [85]. This focus on high-income markets
weakens routine immunization efforts in low-income countries with high incidence of preventable diseases
[86]. Tiered pricing is a mechanism in which different prices are charged based on the income level of the
buyer in an attempt to increase affordability [13]. However, tiered pricing has not been enough to ensure
equitable vaccine access. Even a hypothetical vaccine market that aims to maximize savings for the buyers
(i.e., the difference between reservation prices for a vaccine and the price paid when the purchase is effectuated) fails to overcome disparities in vaccine access [18]. This study hypothesizes that the value of a dollar
in savings varies among buyers (i.e., any dollar saved by a low-income country has higher value relative to
a dollar in savings for a high-income country). We explore an optimization process that explicitly inflates
the value of a dollar saved in low-income countries relative to a dollar saved by any other buyer, thus better
distributing those savings between lower and higher income countries. The distinction of income levels
for tiered pricing uses the 4 level classification from The World Bank [2, 87]: low-income (LIC), lowermiddle-income (LMIC), upper-middle-income (UMIC) and high-income (HIC). In this text, "savings" and
"customer surplus" are used interchangeably.
This chapter’s research question can be summarized as follows:
If vaccine purchasing savings for low-income countries are explicitly prioritized, what is the impact
on savings and profits for the global market?
Answering the research requires a method of prioritization and prescription for the value of a dollar saved.
"Fairness" is not an easily defined concept [88, 89, 90, 91]. Even when looking at other studies in the healthcare industry, the definition of "fairness" is often assumed to be known, implied, or subjectively determined
within the study [92, 93]. In this study, we choose not to define or pursue fairness, but instead analyze the
outcomes of favoring a limited set of countries, whether it is "fair" or not.
In this study, the value of a dollar saved in LICs is the one artificially inflated, with the value of a dollar
saved in LMICs, UMICs and HICs assumed to be the same, and without defining the value of a dollar in
profits. This simplifies our methodology in that once the relative value of a dollar saved is defined for LICs,
no other parameters have to be prescribed.
Given a relative value of a dollar saved, we generate a global procurement plan by modifying an existing
3-step optimization process that assumes a hypothetically coordinated vaccine market (HCVM). In this
HCVM, all market segments negotiate in the global vaccine market through an altruistic central planner that
uses information from those market segments and from all producers to define a vaccine procurement plan
that maximizes the total social surplus (i.e., the sum of savings and profits) [18]. This process attempts to
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define vaccine quantities and prices going to each market segment from each producer in order to maximize
both savings and profits.
Our overall process for the negotiation of vaccine allocation and prices has 5 steps: (1) the value of a dollar
saved in low-income countries is defined from a limited set of pre-determined levels, including a baseline
scenario in which it will be the same as the value in other countries; (2) relative prioritization weights are
calculated for low-income countries; (3) relative weights are calculated for LMICs, UMICs and HICs; (4)
a global procurement plan is determined through an optimization process that maximizes weighted savings
and profits for all countries at once; (5) results of the baseline vaccine procurement plan are compared to
the results in the weighted procurement plan to evaluate how the prescribed value of a dollar saved affects
savings and profits in the global market.
The main contributions of this paper are not in formulation, but in the analysis of how a coordinating
decision-maker explicitly prioritizing some countries over others in the procurement process affects other
buyers and sellers in the global market, as would be the case if all procurement plans could be decided
by organizations such as Gavi or the United Nations. The findings are useful in showing which incentives
should be considered to convince all agents in the system to cooperate. Such approach has hitherto not been
found in the literature covering the global vaccine market.
In Section 5.2, we explore relevant literature in the fields of healthcare, fairness theory, and welfare theory.
Section 5.3 details the process and optimization models used to find dollar values and incorporate them in
the creation of a new procurement plan. Section 5.4 describes the results obtained from the optimization
models using an example with publicly available data for routine childhood immunization. This Section also
includes the analysis on the practicality and implications of such results. Finally, Section 5.5 summarizes
what can be learned from this study and proposes relevant extensions.

5.2

Literature Review

In this section, we explore definitions and metrics of fairness in the global vaccine market that might help
guide our solution process [88, 94, 95, 96, 97], weighted functions in welfare literature, and general modeling approaches when defining optimal procurement plans in the global vaccine market.
A common theme in the literature dealing with fairness is that the term is context-specific [94, 95, 96,
97]. Konow [88] highlights an "Accountability Principle" in the perception of fairness (i.e., variables that
the actor has the power to change are relevant to fairness, whereas those imposed by the environment are
not). Similarly, Fehr and Schmidt [94] highlights the importance of a perception of fairness in any type
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of purchase, or on an exchange between individuals [95]. While Konow [88] considered individuals as the
"actors" under evaluation, in the context of the global vaccine market, those would be the countries. The
discussion on the extent of the influence countries have in their own purchasing power is complex and out
of the scope of this study. We therefore assume that purchasing power is not something that countries can
influence in the timeframe required to prepare a vaccine procurement plan. Konow [89] suggests that the
more savings a country has, the less they will value a new dollar in savings, which supports prescribing
higher values for a dollar saved in lower-income countries.
Lan et al. [90] presents general axioms of metrics measuring the fairness in resource allocation. These
axioms require that a metric of fairness has: (1) continuity, (2) homogeneity, (3) independence from the
number of elements being compared, as long as that number of elements is large, (4) indifferent to partition,
and (5) monotonicity. The authors use these axioms to define a parametric fairness measure that encompasses other widely used metrics from the literature. One of them can be seen in the seminal work of Jain
et al. [98], which proposes an Index of Fairness (i.e., Jain Index). This fairness metric is dependent on a
separate performance measure specific to the scenario being evaluated (i.e., a secondary metric). There are
multiple countries and producers interacting through several purchase interactions that vary depending on
unrelated parameters (e.g., size of the population, supply available, reservation prices). The result is that
it is not trivial to determine the "fair" element that should be distributed equally between all countries and
producers. Thus, for our study, we opt not to measure the fairness of an allocation directly. Instead, we
observe the effects of changing the value of a dollar saved on specific metrics relevant to each stakeholder
(e.g., savings for specific countries, or profits for the market segments).
The literature includes multiple examples in the welfare domain of weighting elements in their objective
functions [91, 99, 100, 101]. Harsanyi [101] in particular discusses social welfare functions that correspond
to the weighted sum of the utilities of each generic actor in the system (i.e., in our case, savings for each
vaccine buyer and profits for each vaccine producer), supporting the proposition of maximizing the sum of
savings weighted by the value each country gives to a dollar saved. Alternative approaches do not easily
map to the global vaccine market. Saez and Stantcheva [99] weights society’s concern for fairness without
relying on individual utility costs. Instead, metrics of effort and value of work are considered. A similar
approach is used by Rabin [91], which relies on individual emotions in a game theory framework. In a global
vaccine market, metrics of work and emotions may not be easily determined, leaving utility maximization
as a simpler way to model welfare.
Multiple authors have explored efficiency incorporated into an objective function for operations research
[102, 103, 104, 105]. Those studies suggest that efficiency, despite being a context-specific concept whose
formula has to be arbitrarily defined, can be a good metric for comparing different elements (i.e., savings,
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in this study). These studies follow a common approach in which fairness is in opposition to efficiency; prioritizing the most efficient elements (i.e., purchasing decisions in the global vaccine market) might exclude
those that would bring less monetary returns even when they are more critical from a fairness perspective
[90, 104, 105, 106]. Thus, prioritizing efficiency could further widen the gap between the different elements
being compared. The implication is that in order to achieve fairness, we might have to prioritize inefficient purchases unable to generate comparable savings. Section 5.4 confirms that prioritizing low-income
countries is indeed a less efficient solution overall, when considering both savings and profits.
The optimization model proposed in this study to represent the utility of all participants is derived from
the Antigen Bundle Pricing (ABP) family of problems proposed in Proano et al. [18]. Those problems
assume a hypothetically coordinated vaccine market (HCVM) in which a coordinating entity decides which
vaccines should be produced, the quantities purchased by each buyer, and the window of price negotiation.
There are three stages three stages to the solution. (1) maximizes utility as the total social surplus (TSS) to
define which vaccines should be produced and its purchase quantities. The TSS is an utility metric that, at
a given price point, considers the sum of both customer surplus (savings) and profits. (2) maximizes total
customer surplus (TCS) across all buyers to determine the prices that would generate the most savings while
still reaching target profit levels for the producers. (3) maximizes total profits (TPF) to calculate the most
profitable prices that producers can charge while still being affordable to all buyers. Together, (2) and (3)
form the window of price negotiation.
Our approach is novel in using the weights as a proxy for the value of a dollar saved in each country when
calculating an utility function. The weights make the problem non-linear, and create unforeseen effects for
both savings and profits. It disrupts the multi-stage approach that relies on that surplus being independent of
prices, justifying Section 5.3.1’s adaptations to the existing vaccine procurement problem. This study fills in
the gap of considering fairness in the procurement decisions of the global vaccine market and on calculating
how different countries may value the savings obtained from different purchases.

5.3

Methodology

Our methodology explores how the incentives of prioritizing low-income countries affect the overall performance of the procurement process.
Given any amount of savings CS (i.e., customer surplus), we can represent the value of a dollar saved as a
factor θ. The valuation of savings is thus represented by θ(CS). As we are interested in the comparative
value of a dollar saved between different countries, in practice the value of savings would be θm (CSm ) for
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P
create a convex combination (i.e., m∈M αm = 1).

P θm

m∈M

θm
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= αm to

∗ for each market segment m is not a trivial task
Calculating the optimal relative value of a dollar saved αm

and is beyond the scope of this study, although the literature suggests a possible link between this value and
the efficiency of each purchase in generating savings [88, 90, 95, 104, 105, 106]. Instead, we investigate
how a range of prescribed values affects the savings for low-income market segments and its impact on the
overall market. As our research question focuses on LICs, the value of the dollar in other market segments
is derived from the value of a dollar saved in LICs, as explained by Postulate 1.

Postulate 1 We define M as the set containing all market segments that negotiate in the global vaccine
market, with LIC ∈ M .
If αLIC = p ⇒ αm =

(1−p)
||M ||−1

∀ m ∈ (M \ LIC)

Note that according to Postulate 1, the range for the relative value of a dollar saved in LICs extends from a
scenario in which all four market segments have the same relative importance (αm = ||M ||−1 ∀ m ∈ M ) to
a scenario in which only the savings in LICs have any real value (αLIC = 100%). Section 5.3.1 discusses
how we incorporate those relative importances into a mathematical model that defines optimal procurement
decisions.

5.3.1

The Weighted Antigen Bundling Pricing Problem (WABP)

In order to present the methodology that links the value of a dollar saved with incentives prioritizing savings
in low-income countries, it is first necessary to discuss the notation.
Sets:
A: set of antigens contained in the vaccines
B: set of vaccines
M : set of market segments in coordination
P : set of vaccine producers
Ba1 : set of vaccines containing antigen a ∈ A
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Bp2 : set of vaccines manufactured by producer p ∈ P
Tm : set of countries grouped into market segment m ∈ M
Parameters:
αm : Relative value of a dollar saved in market m ∈ M .
Rbm : Reservation price of vaccine b ∈ B in market m ∈ M
Cb : Fixed costs and desired profit for producing vaccine b ∈ B
dam : Demand of doses of antigen a ∈ A per child living in market m ∈ M
lm : Population to be vaccinated in market m ∈ M
Sb : Maximum capacity for producing vaccine b ∈ B
ub : Minimum price per dose acceptable for vaccine b ∈ B
k1 : Penalty for unvaccinated population
k2 : Penalty for not meeting the desired return on investment
β: Scaling factor that reduces the order of magnitude of profits relative to savings
Variables:
Xbm : Represents the quantity of vaccine b ∈ B purchased by market m ∈ M
Ybm : Represents price per dose of vaccine b ∈ B purchased by market m ∈ M
gb : Binary variable representing whether or not vaccine b ∈ B is produced
vpP : Represents the deficit of payment for producer p ∈ P if impossible to achieve target profit
A : Represents the deficit of antigen a ∈ A being purchased by market segment m ∈ M
vam

We formally define the customer surplus for each market segment m ∈ M in Equation (5.1).The Total
Customer Surplus (TCS) is a simple sum of the CSm in all market segments. Equation (5.3) represents the
profit of each vaccine producer p ∈ P , with the Total Profits (TPF) corresponding to the simple sum of
P Fp for all producers. The total social surplus (TSS) is an aggregate measure of the benefit generated in
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the system for both customers and producers. It is the sum of the TCS and TPF at a fixed price point. The
resulting expression is Equation (5.5).

X

CSm =

(Rbm − Ybm ) Xbm

(5.1)

b∈B

(5.2)

!
P Fp =

X

X

b∈Bp2

m∈M

Ybm Xbm − Cb gb

(5.3)
(5.4)

!
T SS = T CS + T P F =

X

X

b∈B

m∈M

Rbm Xbm − Cb gb

(5.5)

Given the goal of explicitly prioritizing savings in low-income market segments, the TSS in its original form
is no longer a good metric of overall utility. Instead, we modify it into a Weighted Social Surplus (WSS)
to consider the relative value of a dollar in savings. The resulting expression is Objective Function (5.6),
which we maximize with the following formulation:

!
Max W SS =

X,Y,g,v

X X
b∈B m∈M

[αm (Rbm − Ybm ) Xbm ] + β

X

X

b∈B

m∈M

Xbm Ybm − Cb gb −k1

X X

A
vam
−

a∈A m∈M

−k2

X

vpP

p∈P

(5.6)
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A
Xbm + vam
= dam lm

∀ a ∈ A, m ∈ M

(5.7)

Xbm ≤ Sb gb

∀ b∈B

(5.8)

∀ p∈P

(5.9)

b∈Ba1

X
m∈M

X X

Xbm Ybm + vpP ≥

b∈Bp2 m∈M

X

Cb gb

b∈Bp2

Ybm ≤ Rbm gb

∀ b ∈ B, m ∈ M

(5.10)

Ybm ≥ ub

∀ b ∈ B, m ∈ M

(5.11)

A
Xbm , vam
, vpP ≥ 0

∀ [b, a, m, p] ∈ [B, A, M, P ] (5.12)

gb = {0, 1}

∀b∈B

(5.13)

It is worth noting that αm applies only to the Objective Function (5.6), since it changes the incentives guiding
the allocation, but not which allocations are feasible. Parameter β does not have a meaning related to the
value of a dollar saved, and is instead a scaling factor in cases in which the data generates an imbalance
between the orders of magnitude of savings and the profits. Defining β values or studying its effects is
beyond the scope of this study. The objective function also includes a penalty for incomplete vaccine
A > 0) and for not providing enough revenue to a vaccine producer to cover the desired
coverage (i.e., vam

return on investment (i.e., vpP > 0).
Constraint (5.7) forces the quantity of vaccines purchased to cover an antigen a ∈ A to be equal to the
recommended number of loses dose dam in market m ∈ M multiplied by the annual birth cohort lm of
that same market (i.e., number of infants to be immunized). Constraint (5.8) restricts the total purchased
quantity of a vaccine b ∈ B to the maximum supply Sb , which is available only if the vaccine is chosen
to be produced (i.e., gb = 1). Constraint (5.9) defines vpP by guaranteeing that the profit obtained by each
producer meets the desired return on investment for all vaccines being manufactured. This means not all
vaccines are necessarily profitable on their own, but overall there is profit for the producer, as proposed
in Alves-Maciel and Proano [107] (i.e., Chapter 3). Constraints (5.10) and (5.11) define an upper and
lower bound for vaccine prices, respectively. Constraint (5.10) guarantees that as long as a vaccine is being
procured, its price is lower than the reservation price accepted by a given market m ∈ M . Constraint (5.11)
guarantees that the price of each vaccine b ∈ B in a market m ∈ M is greater than the minimum acceptable
A , and v P ,
price per dose of that vaccine. Constraint (5.12) guarantees non-negativity for variables Xbm , vam
p

while constraint (5.13) defines gb as a binary variable.
Maximizing the WSS informs us what would be the optimal vaccines to produce (gb ) and suggests an allocation of vaccine doses to market segments (Xbm ) that maintains the optimal WSS. However, it is possible
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that the same WSS is generated by several prices per dose across different vaccines and markets for the same
optimal allocation. Therefore, we also evaluate the impact of the relative importance of the dollar saved on
this feasible range for price negotiation. Following Proano et al. [18], we propose a supplemental second
and third stages to the problem that maximize TCS and TPF, respectively. Both stages maintain the vaccine
allocations calculated in stage 1 and focus only on the prices as the decision variable. Given that stages 2
and 3 use the same set of constraints and that the relative value of a dollar saved does not impact the profits,
the formulation for stage 3 is omitted.

MaxT CS =
Y,v

X

αm

m∈M

X

(Rbm − Ybm ) Xbm − k2

Xbm Ybm + vpP ≥

vpP

(5.14)

p∈P

b∈B

X X

X

X

∀ p∈P

(5.15)

Ybm ≤ Rbm gb

∀ b ∈ B, m ∈ M

(5.16)

Ybm ≥ ub

∀ b ∈ B, m ∈ M

(5.17)

vpP ≥ 0

∀ p∈P

(5.18)

b∈Bp2 m∈M

Cb g b

b∈Bp2

Objective function (5.14) maximizes customer surplus across all market segments when considering relative
values of each dollar saved. Constraints (5.15) to (5.17) are unchanged from Stage 1, while Constraint (5.18)
is applies only to variable vpP .

5.3.2

Output Metrics

Aside from the total social surplus, customer surplus, and total profits described in previous sections, we
also calculate other metrics that give us insights into how the value of a dollar saved affects countries and
producers. Those metrics are described in Table 5.1. To show the practical effect of changing incentives
when defining the procurement plan, those metrics are not weighted by the relative value of a dollar saved
l in particular is the
in each market segment (i.e., changing only the weights in the objective function). Ybm

result of an optimization problem that uses the relative values αm , but it is not directly affected.
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Metric

Description

l
Ybm

Lowest profitable prices for a dose of vaccine b ∈ B sold in market m ∈ M . This variable is decided as a result from Stage 2

Mathematical Expression
MaxT CS ∗
Yl
X
X
αm
(Rbm − Ybm ) Xbm

h
Ybm

Highest affordable prices for a dose of vaccine b ∈ B sold in
market m ∈ M . This variable is decided as a result from Stage 3

MaxT P F ∗ =

MV

The total monetary value in the vaccine market. Sum of all the
maximum potential customer savings and all the maximum potential profits.

M V = T CS ∗ + T P F ∗

CSm
MV

Savings in a specific market segment m ∈ M relative to the total
money available in negotiations

m∈M

b∈B

Yh

X X

Xbm Ybm −

b∈B m∈M

X

=

X

Cg gb

b∈B


l
Rbm − Ybm
Xbm

b∈B
MV

Gbc

Eb

Affordability gap for country c ∈ Tm . Represents the difference
between the reservation price in a c̆ountry c for a dose of vaccine
l
b ∈ B and the negotiated price Ybm
at market segment m to
which country c belongs to
Prevalence of vaccine b ∈ B. Represents the percentage of randomized scenarios (RS) in which vaccine b ∈ B is produced,
given a dataset that randomizes reservation prices while keeping
all other parameters constant

l
Rbc − Ybm

X

gbe

e∈RS

Table 5.1: Performance metrics, their explanations and mathematical formulas.
Scenario

LIC

LMIC

UMIC

HIC

A

25%

B

50%

C

75%

D

100%

75%
3 =25%
50%
3 =16.7%
25%
3 = 8.3%
0%
3 = 0%

75%
3 =25%
50%
3 =16.7%
25%
3 = 8.3%
0%
3 = 0%

75%
3 =25%
50%
3 =16.7%
25%
3 = 8.3%
0%
3 = 0%

Table 5.2: The relative value of a dollar saved in each of the four market segments depending on the prescribed value for LICs.

5.3.3

Experimentation Setup

In this section, we describe the experimentation procedure and dataset used to evaluate the impact of changing the value of a dollar saved. Our experimental scenarios consider countries segmented into four tiers for
pricing purposes as defined by The World Bank [87]. Our experimental factor in this study is the relative
value of a dollar saved in the low-income market segment. We test four levels for this factor, and use it
as a basis to calculate the relative value of a dollar saved in other market segments. We do not evaluate
differences between the value of a dollar saved in LMICs, UMICs and HICs, instead weighting all three
equally. Table 5.2 shows the relative value of a dollar saved in all scenarios explored.
Note that scenario (A) corresponds to a baseline scenario in which there is no difference between the value
of a dollar saved in each market segment. Conversely, scenario (D) proposes that the coordinating entity
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in the HCVM is interested only in savings for low-income countries. The constraints in the formulation
presented in Section 5.3.1 prevent the prices to go beyond the reservation prices in other market segments,
but there is no incentive to expand the affordability gap.
Also related to the formulation of the WABP, the model was simplified for our experiments through the
McCormick linearization (i.e., a variable wbm replaces the multiplication Xbm Ybm . The value of wbm is then
constrained through the known bounds of Xbm and Ybm .). This linearized model is then used to evaluate
the TSS, TCS and TPF of a single experimental dataset whose reservation prices are randomized between
90% and 110% of the baseline values for each market segment. All the metrics described in Section 5.3.2
are then collected before the process is repeated for the next instance of randomized data. The collected
metrics are then compiled and compared between the different levels proposed for the value of a dollar
saved. Algorithm 4 summarizes the solution procedure, also illustrated by Figure 5.1.
Algorithm 4 Solution Procedure
1: for each data instance e ∈ Exp do
2:
for each level αLIC ∈ [25%,50%,75%,100%] do
3:
Solve the first Stage of the WABP
4:
Fix quantities of vaccines being sold to each market segment
5:
Define upper and lower price bounds per vaccine dose through Stages 2 and 3 of the WABP
6:
for every vaccine b ∈ B do
7:
for every market segment m ∈ M do
8:
for each country c ∈ Tm do
9:
Collect metrics of savings at a country level
10:
Collect metrics of interested for instance of data e at relative value of a dollar αLIC
11: Compile output and analyze results
Table 5.3 summarizes key values in the dataset. The complete data files are available in Appendix 5.6 with
more details.

5.4

Results

We start the presentation of our results with the metrics on the general system showing the effects of changing the relative value of the dollar. Those are the TCS, TPF and TSS, shown in Figures 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4
respectively. Note that the results show the TSS rather than WSS to reflect the actual social surplus without
arbitrary weights.
The boxplots in Figure 5.2 show that even when prioritizing LICs by a high margin (i.e., 75% relative
value), the overall savings across all market segments remain stable. On the other hand, at some αLIC value
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Value used
100 repetitions
Set of 6 antigens used in routine childhood immunizations (Haemophilus influenzae type B,
Diphtheria-Tetanus-Pertussis, Hepatitis B, varicella, Measles-Mumps-Rubella, Inactivated
polio)
Set of 52 vaccines that offer one or more of the antigens from set A. They are produced each
by a manufacturer from set P
Set of 4 market segments representing each LIC, LMIC, UMIC or HIC
Set of 14 producers that can manufacture each a subset of the possible vaccines represented
in set B
Set of 194 countries that are grouped into the four market segments in M according to their
GNI per capita
Average reservation prices of all countries stratified into market segment m. Its baseline
value can be calculated with the method described in Mosquera [51], then randomized between 90% and 110% of the original value
Annualized value of the fixed costs for producing vaccine b for a given time horizon, including a desired return on investment
Sum of the average birth cohort of all countries stratified into market segment m
Arbitrarily set to 1010 . The value is sufficient to guarantee both the desired profits and the
complete immunization of the population
Arbitrarily set to 10−2 . The value scales profits down sufficiently for the effects of the
savings to be clear in the results
Table 5.3: Description of values used in our experiments.
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Figure 5.2: Changes in TCS as the relative value of a dollar saved in LICs changes. At some point between
the prescribed values of 75% and 100%, there is a sharp decline on the TCS.

between 75% and 100%, the contribution from LMICs, UMICs and HICs to the Objective Function is so
small that it is no longer desirable to sell anything to them, eliminating their contributions to the TCS.
Figure 5.3 shows how the profits behave as the value of a dollar saved in LICs changes. Unlike the TCS,
the profits show decrease as soon as the relative importance of LICs increases. Given that incentives would
decrease the importance of savings, but not profits, one possible explanation for the results is that, as LICs
seek to expand their savings, they start procuring more valuable vaccines (i.e., vaccines with higher reservation prices per dose) for low prices. The other market segments then would cover the annuity costs by
satisfying their demands through less profitable vaccines. This hypothesis is pursued and confirmed later in
this Section.
The similarity between TSS and TPF seen when comparing Figures 5.3 and 5.4 suggests that the highest
affordable prices coincide with the reservation prices, without any effect from other constraints.
Figure 5.5 confirms that using the relative value of a dollar saved in LICs as a multiplier to incentivize
higher savings is effective. However, the Figure suggests that at some point of relative importance between
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Figure 5.3: Changes in TPF as the relative value of a dollar saved in LICs changes. Despite not being
directly affected by the value of savings in their calculation, the overall profits decrease as the relative value
of a dollar saved in LICs increase.

50% and 75%, the savings for LICs reach a plateau in which any increase is marginal (but still statistically
significant, as shown in Table 5.4). Conversely, Figure 5.6 shows that the savings in higher-income market
segments starts at a plateau and then starts decreasing at some point between 50% and 75% (LMICs and
UMICs follow the same pattern as HICs, so Figures are omitted). The implication is that increasing the
relative value of a dollar saved in LICs can generate more savings with no statistically significant impacts to
the savings in other market segments, while also maintaining profits above the desired return on investment
for producers. Table 5.4 details key comparisons between the box-plots in which the statistical significance
is not evident, and shows that while there is some evidence for increasing savings in LICs, when changing
from 75% relative value of a dollar saved in LICs to 100%, there is no evidence that the overall changes are
changing until this last increase.
The Figures also show that increasing the relative value of a dollar saved beyond a given point is not only
undesirable for the higher-income market segments, but also is no longer useful for LICs. The fall in general
TPF also implies a less healthy global market that would have less money to invest in R&D for new vaccines.
The result is congruent with the discussion in Section 5.2; The purchases for low-income countries are less
efficient in generating savings, since their lower reservation prices are closer to the lowest feasible prices
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Figure 5.4: Changes in TSS as the relative value of a dollar saved in LICs changes. The pattern and its
values are identical to the TPF.

and result in less total social surplus [90, 104, 105, 106]. It is worth noting, however, that the exact point
in which those incentives change is highly dependent on the data – and the choice of β in particular – even
though the pattern with the stagnated gains remains the same regardless.
Figure 5.7 offers a more detailed view on how countries are affected when the relative value of the dollar
saved changes for the entire market segment. At the baseline scenario, all countries have a positive affordComparison
TCS for scenarios with α ≤ 0.75. Refer to Figure 5.2
Savings in LICs when α = 0.75 compared to α = 1. Corresponds to the last two boxes in
Figure 5.5
Savings in HICs when α = 0.25 compared to α = 0.5. Corresponds to the first two boxes
in Figure 5.6
Vaccine occurrence when considering different values for αLIC and different bundles. Refer
to Figure 5.8

p-value
< 10−5
0.01
0.98
< 10−2

Table 5.4: Statistical significance for key comparisons. Lower p-values represent lower probability that the
compared metrics have the same mean.
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Figure 5.5: Changes in the customer surplus for the low-income market segment as the relative value of a
dollar saved in LICs changes. The savings generally increase as the importance of the dollar saved by LICs
increases as well.

ability gap in most instances of data. Uniform outliers correspond to specific vaccines being produced in
a small number of data instances. Scenarios with relative value of a dollar saved in LICs 50% and 75%
were omitted due to their similarity to the baseline scenario (as expected from the results in Figure 5.2). As
the importance of LICs increases, the percentage of instances in which they have positive affordability gaps
also increases, and higher values can be reached. However, the scenario in which only savings for LICs are
considered confirms that other market segments are paying their reservation prices for each dose of vaccines
(i.e., the maximum affordable prices). As the reservation price of a market segment is calculated based on
an average of the countries within it, we can see that the most affluent countries in each market segment still
can achieve positive affordability gaps in most or all instances of data, whereas the least affluent countries
in those same market segments may be always paying above their reservation prices. Figure 5.7 thus contributes to the argument that focusing only on LICs is undesirable, as it creates an unsustainable situation for
many of the countries in other market segments. Figure 5.3 shows that even paying the reservation prices in
LMICs, UMICs and HICs (as evident in Figures 5.6 and 5.7) is not enough to maintain profits at the same
high-level as the baseline scenario. The implication is that the types of vaccines being chosen in Stage 1
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Figure 5.6: Changes in the customer surplus for the low-income market segment as the relative value of a
dollar saved in LICs changes. The savings generally increase as the importance of the dollar saved by LICs
increases as well.

change depending on the relative importance put on the savings per dose of the LICs.
Figure 5.8 shows that indeed the choice of vaccines changes as the value of a dollar saved in LICs increases.
Critically, 100% of produced doses of combination vaccines with higher reservation prices represented at
the right-side of the chart are purchased in LICs when the relative value of a dollar saved is at least 75%. The
narrow boxplots show that this happens in every instance of data. This is how low-income countries are able
to achieve higher CS; there is more volume of high-value vaccines being purchased by low prices, generating
less revenue from the vaccines that have the highest annuity. Other market segments are then trying to cover
their antigen needs with simpler combination vaccines. Even paying their maximum acceptable prices for
those vaccines, the revenue is not high enough to generate much additional profits after covering the annuity
of the expensive vaccines. Note that this change in vaccine choices also explain why Figure 5.2 shows stable
savings whereas the profits are falling in Figure 5.3: the choice of vaccines changes the total annuity that
must be covered, with LICs preferring higher-value vaccines. The increased reservation prices still allow
for larger savings, but the annuities of the new vaccine portfolio increase more than the reservation prices
do, leading to lower profits.
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Figure 5.7: Changes in the affordability gap across all countries at the extreme relative values of a dollar
saved in LICs.
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Figure 5.8: Changes in the choice of vaccines being manufactured. The bars show the percentage of
available supply for each vaccine in any instance of data in which the value of a dollar saved in LICs
corresponds to the given number above the charts.

5.5

Conclusion

In this study, we examined how changes in the value of a dollar saved for low-income countries would
affect their own savings and the other agents operating in the global vaccine market. To do so, we proposed
changes to the relative value of a dollar saved as a weighting factor to incentivize prioritizing low-income
countries. Those incentives are modeled through a 3-stage optimization process that determines first which
vaccines should be produced and how many doses are purchased by each buyer, then the lowest prices for
those doses that would still meet the desired return on investment for the vaccine producers, and finally the
highest prices that would still be affordable for low-income countries. We demonstrate our methodology
through a numerical example related to childhood immunization vaccines. We kept track of key metrics
related to savings for different countries and market segments, and profits for the manufacturers. We tested
four different relative priorities for low-income countries: 25%, 50%, 75% and 100%. The scenario with
25% prioritization is our baseline in which all market segments are treated equally.
Our results suggest that artificially prioritizing savings in low-income countries can increase those savings
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with no detriment to higher-income countries. As the relative value of a dollar saved in low-income countries
increases, the selection of which vaccines to produce also changes, with low-income countries extracting
higher customer surplus from more costly vaccines, while higher-income countries generate less revenue
by pursuing lower-cost vaccines. The result is stable savings for countries, but diminishing profits for the
producers, as they are forced to offer more expensive vaccines without an accompanying increase in revenue
(crucially, the desired rates of return are still met even when only low-income countries are considered when
determining the procurement plan). Our results also suggest that there exists an optimal value of a dollar
saved in low-income countries that achieves savings in low-income countries comparable to the maximum
savings of the 100% relative value scenario, while at the same time having the minimum possible impact on
the profit of producers (and no impact in the savings of other market segments).
As practical implications of our study, altruistic coordinating entities such as UNICEF would be more able
to generate savings for the countries they represent by explicitly prioritizing the needs of the least affluent
countries while making decisions. Whereas this would reduce revenue for the vaccine producers, countries
that negotiate without coordination might keep revenue at higher levels. In a global scale, the results show
that since the savings depend mostly on the selection of vaccines available for purchase, the producers would
have little incentive to accept a portfolio of vaccines that does not maximize their profits. In terms of buyers, higher-income countries could accept incentives to prioritize savings in lower-income countries when
vaccine production schedules are being decided, as there would be little impact to their own savings. However, as the five corporations producing the majority of the value sold in the vaccine market originate from
high-income countries, particularly with complex multivalent vaccines, political pressure might prevent the
countries to adopt such prioritization. Lower-middle and upper-middle income countries might elect to
coordinate the selection of vaccines to be procured, but not the price negotiation. The higher-volume and
percentage of revenue could create enough pressure for producers to accept the prioritization of low-income
countries. Designing incentives for coordination is out of the scope of this study, but could help cement its
findings.

5.5.1

Future Work

A logical extension of this study would be to evaluate how the value of a dollar profited might be considered
in conjunction with the value of a dollar saved, considering the existence of multiple producers and multiple
market segments. A similar approach might be used to evaluate how prescribed values for those variables
could affect the global market, and maybe suggest better incentives for vaccine producers to coordinate their
portfolio selection.
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As discussed in Section 5.2, there is a possible link between the efficiency of a purchase in generating savings and the value of a dollar saved. A possible extension could explore this link in order to determine
a process that finds optimal relative values of dollars in any dataset without need for explicit prioritization. Early results have been found using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) as a methodology to calculate
prioritization weights, but that does not seem to be a promising avenue for this extension.
Whereas this study forces the relative value of a dollar saved to be higher in low-income countries, a future
study could reexamine the process using "fairness" as part of the decision making. Early results explored
how the distribution of savings for different countries might be used to generate a "fairness" metric through
a tool called the Jain Index. A future study could better define "fairness" in the global vaccine market, a way
to measure it, and a process to improve it.

5.6

Appendix: Detailed datasets

The datasets used in this study are available at https://github.com/ba8641/DollarValue.

Chapter 6

Overall Conclusions
The studies compiled in this work showcase the usefulness of optimization in determining incentives to
improve savings and profits in the global pediatric vaccine market. Our research questions challenge the
effectiveness and practicality of coordination in the vaccine market by analyzing different approaches buyers
and vaccine producers can adopt to maximize their savings and profits. As a whole, this body of work
provides guidance to decision makers that operate with or without coordination, and offers insights into
what incentives favor specific agents in the system while maintaining the global market sustainable. Those
incentives often present conflicts between the interests of countries and producers, or between low-income
and high-income countries, leading to several possible market configurations that could be combined for
optimal results.
The key findings from Chapter 2 suggests that coordination efforts within international organizations could
benefit from higher market segmentation for pricing purposes to improve affordability. Radical changes in
the negotiation format of the global market are shown to be unnecessary, but mitigate disruptions in the
supply chain. As shown by the COVID-19 pandemic, such disruptions are possible and unpredictable, suggesting that international entities might opt to change negotiation order to guarantee access to supply while
maintaining affordability and profits. Chapter 3 shows that by including different market segments in the
negotiation process, it is possible to further increase savings while maintaining the lower risks of disruption
that come when low-income countries negotiate first. This is corroborated also by the findings in Chapter 5,
which suggest that explicitly prioritizing savings for low-income countries can be effective without impact
to other market segments. Whereas some of those negotiation approaches could diminish the profits for
vaccine producers, Chapter 4 shows that changing the payment scheme to aggregate all revenue can counter
those lower profits by decreasing the risk of vaccine production at the cost of potentially consolidating the
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supply of vaccines in even fewer agents.
This work has also contributed with novel methodological approaches to modeling different types of negotiation processes that might be applicable to sectors other than vaccines or healthcare in general. Other
public goods such as energy supply might benefit from similar optimization or simulation methods, but even
smaller-scale sellers and buyers in different markets may adopt insights from the coordination processes
explored in previous chapters. Small studies could show the application of the methodology presented in
previous chapters on those other markets, whereas larger studies could expand upon the mathematical modeling innovations and simulation approaches.

6.1

Practical Implications

One of the goals of Gavi and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation is to develop market-shaping strategies.
The insights from the Chapters presented in this thesis contribute with many possible options for future
planning, but can also be readily implemented by some of the international organizations without requiring massive changes to the global vaccine market. As an example, following the conclusions of Chapter
2, Gavi and UNICEF could reorganize the countries they negotiate for into more market segments when
considering the pricing of co-payments for the vaccines. This strategy could better distribute the savings
and increase affordability. Philanthropic organizations active in the market (e.g., the Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation) could refocus humanitarian aid projects to incentivize collaboration between different market
segments during the negotiation process to better reflect the scenarios from Chapter 3. The Pan American
Health Organization already includes members from different income levels, so its Revolving Fund for vaccine acquisition could incorporate principles of discriminating internal price points and prioritizing different
valuation for savings in different countries (Chapter 5).
Similarly, producers can take advantage of our conclusions by changing their pricing strategy or product
offerings. Existing vaccine producers can reconsider the tendering process for offering vaccines to bundle
multiple complementary products to captivate a higher market share while also simplifying the negotiation
process and ensuring profitability for the whole operation. New potential entrants to the global vaccine
market can use the findings to determine which types of vaccines would be most profitable in the market
segment they target.
The principal long-term market-shaping strategy would be to expand the coordination process to more countries. As discussed in Chapter 1, there are many obstacles preventing countries from coordinating, not the
least of which being the political will to relinquish vaccine purchasing decisions. Whereas this thesis high-
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lights many benefits of coordination that might help persuade leaders, the effort required for this change will
likely involve many more questions outside our scope.
In summary, this body of work creates new value to the field of Operations Research, both methodological
and applied, and provides specific insights that could help design a more sustainable global vaccine market.
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